The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a TSCA citizen suit concerning EPA's decision on a petition to require testing for 54 per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). Four citizen groups argued that EPA's decision, which granted the petition and agreed to require testing on PFAS as a class through its own testing protocol, was effectively a denial of their petition because the Agency did not require direct testing on 47 of the substances identified and did not adopt their testing strategy. A district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding the decision was a grant in fact because EPA reasonably chose to grant the request to test the 54 PFAS as a category and that the groups did not have the right to compel adoption of their specific testing program. The appellate court agreed, finding EPA followed TSCA's requirements when choosing to treat the 54 PFAS as a class and that it did not effectively deny the petition by declining to adopt the proposed testing program. It affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit reversed in part summary judgment for the operators of a marine cargo terminal on Puget Sound in a CWA citizen suit concerning stormwater discharges. An environmental group argued the operators were liable for discharges from the facility's entire footprint, including an area known as the "wharf." A district court granted partial summary judgment for the operators, holding the terminal's 2010 and 2015 industrial stormwater general permits (ISGPs) did not extend to the entire footprint of facilities that conducted industrial activity. The appellate court found the plain text of the two ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility, that the terminal was conducting industrial activities, and that the operators needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the footprint of the terminal while the ISGPs were in effect. It reversed summary judgment for the terminal operators on this issue.

A district court adopted a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations to remand to state court a climate liability lawsuit brought by an Oregon county against oil and gas companies. The county initially sued in state court, arguing the companies failed to warn consumers about the negative effects of their products. The companies removed the suit to federal court on federal jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction grounds, and the county moved to remand. The magistrate judge found the court did not have federal jurisdiction over the suit and that the companies failed to show one of the defendants was fraudulently joined, and recommended that the county's motion be granted. The court adopted the judge's findings and recommendations, and remanded the suit.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 6-3, held the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority and that courts may not defer to an agency's interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous, overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in two lawsuits concerning application of the Chevron framework to a rule promulgated by NMFS pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA). In both suits, commercial fishing companies challenged the rule, arguing the MSA did not authorize the agency to mandate that they pay for observers required by a fishery management plan. Two district courts granted summary judgment for NMFS, deferring to the agency's interpretation under Chevron. Two appellate courts affirmed, deferring to the agency's interpretation as a "reasonable" construction of the MSA in one of the suits and as not "exceed[ing] the bounds of the permissible" in the other. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both, limiting the question to whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified. The Court found the deference Chevron required of courts reviewing agency action could not be squared with the APA, which directs courts to "decide legal questions by applying their own judgment." According to the majority, "Chevron defies the command of the APA that 'the reviewing court'—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to 'decide all relevant questions of law' and 'interpret...statutory provisions,'" and when it comes to statutory ambiguities, even those involving technical or scientific questions that fall within an agency's area of expertise, "Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions." It overruled Chevron, vacated the appellate judgments in both suits, and remanded for further proceedings. Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., filed concurring opinions. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined, and in which Jackson, J., joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Jackson, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 5-4, granted three states' and several industry groups' applications to stay enforcement of EPA's 2023 rule issuing a federal implementation plan (FIP) for 23 states whose SIPs the Agency determined had failed to adequately address new air quality standards for ozone levels under the CAA's "good neighbor" provision. EPA based the FIP on which emission control measures would maximize cost-effectiveness in improving ozone levels in downwind states and on the assumption the FIP would apply to all covered states. It also designed the plan to be severable, such that if any state dropped out, the plan would apply unchanged to the remaining states. Lower courts subsequently stayed 12 of the SIP disapprovals, precluding EPA from imposing the FIP on those states. The applicants challenged the FIP, arguing the decision to apply the plan after 12 states had "dropped out" was arbitrary and capricious, and sought to stay any effort to enforce the FIP against them pending appeal. The Court found EPA did not address whether and how measures found to maximize cost-effectiveness in achieving downwind ozone air quality improvements with the participation of 23 states would continue to do so when fewer states were subject to the plan, despite the concern having been raised during the public comment period. Finding the applicants were likely to succeed on their claim, it stayed enforcement of the rule pending disposition of petitions for review in the D.C. Circuit and any petitions for writ of certiorari. Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 6-3, held the Seventh Amendment entitled an investment advisor to a jury trial in an enforcement action initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking civil penalties for securities fraud. The SEC adjudicated the matter administratively, and determined the advisor had committed securities violations and levied a $300,000 civil penalty. The advisor petitioned for review, and the Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that the agency adjudication violated the advisor's right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court found the action implicated the Seventh Amendment because the SEC's antifraud provisions replicated common-law fraud and it was well established that common-law claims must be heard by a jury; and that the "public rights" exception did not apply because the action here did not fall within any of the distinctive areas involving governmental prerogatives where the Court has concluded that a matter may be resolved outside of an Article III court, without a jury. It held the Seventh Amendment applied and a jury was required. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit ruling and remanded for further proceedings. Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 5-4, denied two states' motion to enter into a consent decree in a lawsuit concerning a 1938 interstate agreement that apportions the waters of the Rio Grande River among Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Texas initially sued Colorado and New Mexico, arguing excessive groundwater pumping in New Mexico was depleting supplies of Rio Grande water bound for Texas. The U.S. government moved to intervene, and the Court allowed it because it found the government had its own distinct interests in holding New Mexico to its obligations under the agreement, which was "inextricably intertwined" with the government's operation of the irrigation system in southern New Mexico. Texas and New Mexico subsequently sought approval of a proposed consent decree that would resolve the suit and codify a methodology for allocating each state's share of the river's waters. A special master recommended that the Court approve the consent decree. The U.S. government objected and filed an exception, arguing the decree would dispose of its claims that New Mexico's groundwater pumping was violating the agreement. The Court held that since the proposed decree would dispose of the government's valid claims without its consent, the motion to enter the decree was denied. It sustained the government's exception. Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., joined.

The D.C. Circuit denied petitions to review FERC's approval of a project that would expand service on a natural gas pipeline running from western Pennsylvania to the New York metropolitan area. A nonprofit group argued FERC's EIS failed to quantify greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from upstream drilling for the extra gas, failed to quantify ozone emissions from its downstream burning, and failed to categorize emissions impacts as significant or insignificant. It further argued the Commission did not adequately consider state and city laws in mandating reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. The court found FERC reasonably concluded there was too much uncertainty regarding the number and location of additional upstream wells, reasonably explained its decision to not give a quantitative estimate of how much ozone would be produced, and amply discussed the "significance" of GHG emissions despite not having attached a specific label. It further found the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act did not undercut FERC's finding of need. The court denied the group's petitions.

The D.C. Circuit, 2-1, affirmed summary judgment for BLM in a challenge to the agency's 2003 final rule withdrawing a proposed rule that would have limited the maximum size of "mill sites" for mining claims on federal lands and instead codifying the agency's historical understanding that the governing statute imposed no such limit. Environmental groups argued BLM's interpretation of §42 of the 1872 Mining Law was unreasonable because §42 unambiguously limited a claimant to one five-acre mill site per mining claim. The appellate court concluded the operative words of §42 plainly contained no limit on the number of mill sites a claim owner might locate. The groups next argued BLM violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS. The court found the final rule was not a "major federal action," and thus BLM was not required to prepare an EIS. The groups also argued BLM violated the notice provision of the APA by issuing the final rule without an additional notice-and-comment cycle, but the court found the rule to be a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule. It affirmed summary judgment for BLM.

In an unpublished per curiam judgment, the D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for NMFS in a challenge to the Service's 2019 rule regarding turtle excluder devices. Environmental groups argued the final rule was not adequately explained, that it was not a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule that preceded it, and that NMFS was required by NEPA to conduct a species-by-species analysis of the protected turtle population rather than an analysis of the aggregate population. A district court granted summary judgment for NMFS. The appellate court found NMFS adequately explained why it chose to require fewer shrimpers to use turtle excluder devices in the final rule than in the proposed rule—to impose a smaller economic burden on the fishing industry—and that the final rule fell squarely within the range of options in the proposed rule. It further found the NEPA claim was forfeited because the groups failed to raise it during the administrative process. The court affirmed summary judgment for NMFS.