The Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a challenge to the U.S. Air Force's decision to engage in hazardous waste disposal through open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) operations at Tarague Beach on Guam. A nonprofit group argued the Air Force failed to comply with its environmental review obligations under NEPA. The district court held the group lacked standing because its injury was not fairly traceable to to the Air Force's conduct, that the challenge was not ripe because the Air Force had not engaged in final agency action, and that even if the court had jurisdiction, the group had failed to state a claim because RCRA's permitting process made NEPA review "redundant" and a "waste of resources." The appellate court found the possibility that the agency might have chosen a different place or method for handling the waste had it taken the requisite "hard look" and appropriately engaged the public before committing to its plan for disposal made the group's injury fairly traceable, and was enough to establish standing. It also found the Air Force's decision to apply for a RCRA permit and the details of its planned activities in the application reflected the agency's commitment to a particular location for and method of waste disposal, such that it had engaged in final agency action ripe for judicial review. Last, it found RCRA's permitting process did not make NEPA's mandated environmental review "superfluous," and that NEPA applied to the decision to conduct OB/OD operations at the beach. The court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

A district court granted EPA's and OMB's motion to dismiss a challenge brought by California youth against certain agency policies for allegedly undervaluing the lives of children in cost-benefit analyses and thus harming them by failing to resolve the climate crisis. The youth argued the policies violated the Equal Protection Clause and Take Care Clause, and sought a permanent injunction. The agencies moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court found the youth failed to show traceability as to their environmental harms—that the policies resulted in underregulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which burdened them by disrupting their education, recreation, and religious expression—because the agencies' policies were not legally binding; and that they failed to show injury-in-fact as to their discrimination harms—that the policies resulted in a suboptimal rate of future GHG emissions, which would disproportionately impact present-day children—because the harms would be experienced relatively equally by all people alive at the time of the impacts. It granted the motion to dismiss without leave to amend.

A district court denied environmental groups' motion to preliminarily enjoin a tornado recovery operations project in Hoosier National Forest. The groups argued the Forest Service improperly excluded the project from NEPA's research and reporting requirements and began implementing the project before adequately studying its environmental effects. They sought a preliminary injunction, alleging four types of irreparable harm: harm to tricolored bats, damage to historic sites, removal of healthy old growth trees, and "informational harm." The court found the groups failed to demonstrate "likely" irreparable harm to tricolored bats or historic sites, and failed to address harm resulting from the removal of healthy old growth trees and informational harm in their briefs. It held that damage to the environment is a type of damage that is typically irreparable, but that the groups had not shown imminent, irreparable harm from the remaining project activities, and it denied the motion.

A district court granted the Army Corps of Engineers' motion to dismiss a developer's challenge to the Corps' 2012 jurisdictional determination over certain wetlands in Virginia. The developer challenged the Corps' significant nexus finding between the wetlands and the Northwest River, arguing the significant nexus test no longer controlled for finding jurisdiction under the CWA based on the Supreme Court's decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 U.S. 651 (2023). The Corps moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court found the developer's challenge of the Corps' successful defense of its 2012 jurisdictional determination and its continuing impact on the wetlands was not an agency action, let alone a final agency action subject to judicial review. It dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.

The First Circuit reversed a district court ruling in a challenge to NMFS' 2024 rule finalizing a 2022 emergency rule that seasonally banned vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing from certain federal waters off Massachusetts to reduce risk of injury or death to the endangered North Atlantic right whale. A group of fishermen argued the final rule conflicted with a temporary status authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court held the final rule was "void and unenforceable" under the rider because it was not "in place" on December 29, 2022, when the rider became law. The appellate court concluded the final rule was "in place" on December 29, 2022, and therefore was permitted by an exception to that authorization contained in the same rider. It reversed the district court ruling and remanded for further proceedings.

The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) in a challenge to enforcement of regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. An Indian tribe sued DEC and its commissioner, arguing a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the tribe that allowed tribal members to “freely whale or fish for or with” the colonists was a valid and enforceable treaty preempting DEC's regulations as applied to members in the tribe's customary off-reservation fishing waters. A district court granted summary judgment for DEC, holding the agreement was not federal law preempting New York's fishing regulations. The appellate court held the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims against DEC, but that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applied to claims asserted against the commissioner. It further held the 1676 agreement was not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and had not been ratified by the United States. It thus did not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, including those prohibiting harvesting of American glass eels in off-reservation New York waters. The court affirmed summary judgment for DEC and its commissioner.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of a motion to remand to state court a lawsuit concerning oil and gas production in New Orleans. The city of New Orleans sued several pipeline operators and a natural gas utility in state court, arguing they violated Louisiana's State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act (SLCRMA) in their oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation activities within the Orleans Parish coastal zone. The operators removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds, arguing the utility was improperly joined. The city moved to remand, and the district court denied the motion, holding there was no reasonable basis to predict that the city might be able to recover on its claims against the utility because the city did not allege any conduct by the utility that was not lawfully commenced prior to SLCRMA's effective date. The appellate court found the district court did not err in disregarding the utility's citizenship, and that there was complete diversity of citizenship among the properly joined parties because the city filed the suit on its own behalf. It affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to remand.

A district court granted the Biden Administration's motion to dismiss a challenge to the president's 2023 designation of Baaj Nwaavjo I’tah Kukveni—Ancestral Footprints of the Grand Canyon National Monument. The Arizona state legislature, a cattle rancher, and other plaintiffs argued Proclamation No. 10606 exceeded the president's authority to designate national monuments under the Antiquities Act. The government moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The court found the legislature's alleged injuries belonged to the state, and that the rancher's alleged fears of prosecution for damaging grass or moving pottery shards did not amount to a substantial threat of criminal penalties being enforced on him. Because neither party had established standing, it granted the motion to dismiss.

The Fourth Circuit vacated a district court order that denied a motion to preliminarily enjoin the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission's recommended fishery management plan (FMP) for striped bass. A trade group, a group of charter boat captains, and two individuals operating in Maryland sued the Commission, alleging due process and takings claims under the U.S. Constitution and related claims under the Maryland Constitution. The district court found plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, concluding they likely lacked standing because their alleged injuries were unlikely to be redressed by enjoining the FMP. The appellate court concluded plaintiffs lacked standing because they were regulated by Maryland, not the Commission, and they did not allege that enjoining the recommended plan would likely cause Maryland to rescind its own regulations; even if they had, they would have needed to bolster that allegation with specific reasons supporting it, as Maryland adopted stricter measures than the FMP called for. The appellate court vacated the order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the suit.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of a motion to temporarily enjoin construction on a real estate development project in South Carolina. Environmental groups argued the CWA §404 permit issued for the project violated the ESA by using a habitat surrogate to set the level of anticipated take of the endangered northern long-eared bat, and violated NEPA because it was issued after completing an EA rather than an EIS. The district court concluded the groups did not have a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits, would not experience irreparable harm absent an injunction, and that the balance of equities did not fall in their favor. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the groups did not have a sufficient likelihood of success.