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DEC 07 2018

ANGIE SPARKS, Clerk of District Court

# MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

MONTANORE MINERALS CORP., TROY MINE INC., and RC RESOURCES, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

٧.

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TOM LIVERS, as the Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality,

Defendants.

Cause No. ADV-2018-363

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Montanore Minerals Corp., Troy Mine, Inc., and RC Resources, Inc.'s motion for preliminary injunction and Defendants Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and its Director, Tom Livers' (Livers) motion to dismiss. William W. Mercer, Kyle

Anne Gray, and Victoria A. Marquis represent Plaintiffs. James H. Goetz, Jeffrey J. Tierney, and Keith Strong represent Defendants. Katherine K. O'Brien, Amanda D. Galvan, and Timothy J. Preso represent Intervenors Earthworks, Montana Environmental Information Center, Clark Fork Coalition, Rock Creek Alliance, Save Our Cabinets and Montana Conservation Voters and proposed Intervenor Ksanka Kupaqa Za'l¢in. Daniel D. Belcourt and David A. Bell represent proposed Intervenor Fort Belknap Indian Community.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs are Montanore Minerals Corp, which owns the Montanore Mine in Lincoln County; Troy Mine, Inc., which owns the Troy Mine in Lincoln County; and RC Resources, Inc., which owns the Rock Creek Mine in Sanders County. The Plaintiffs' parent company is Hecla Mining Company. Phillips S. Baker Jr. (Baker) is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Hecla Mining Company.

On March 20, 2018, DEQ Director Livers informed Plaintiffs that DEQ had reason to believe Plaintiffs were in violation of the Montana Metal Mine Reclamation Act (MMRA), Montana Code Annotated § 82-4-301, et seq., specifically, the "bad actor" provision contained in Montana Code Annotated § 82-4-360, which provides:

[A] person may not conduct mining or exploration activities in this state if that person or any firm or business association of which that person was a principal or controlling member had a bond forfeited under this part, if the department otherwise received proceeds from a surety to perform reclamation on that person's behalf, or if the person's surety completed reclamation on the person's behalf.

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In his letter, Livers indicated DEQ viewed Baker as "an Officer, Director or otherwise a controlling principal" of several mining companies ("the Pegasus entities") previously engaged in mining activities in Montana. According to Livers, DEQ received proceeds from a surety for the Pegasus entities to perform reclamation work. Because Baker was a principal or controlling member of the Pegasus entities when DEQ received the surety proceeds, he is now prohibited from conducting mining and exploration activities in Montana under the bad actor provision of the MMRA. Baker, as President and CEO of Hecla, is currently conducting mining and exploration activities in Montana, in violation of the MMRA.

DEQ's letter recommended two courses of action – Plaintiffs may reimburse DEQ, with interest, for the reclamation and any additional penalty amounts; or, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that neither Baker nor entities under his direction will conduct mining and exploration activities in Montana. If DEQ did not receive confirmation from Plaintiffs within thirty days, the DEQ indicated it might issue an administrative order or pursue judicial action. The letter further indicated DEQ has the authority to suspend exploration licenses and operating permits under Montana Code Annotated § 82-4-362(1). In conclusion, the letter contained the following provision: "If you disagree with DEQ's determination, you may write a letter stating the nature of your disagreement accompanied by any supporting documentation. DEQ will consider the information provided before pursuing further action."

Upon receipt of the letter, Plaintiffs filed their complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint three days later seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction "enjoining the Department

from taking any action to suspend, revoke, or otherwise affect exploration licenses or operating permits under the Metal Mine Reclamation statutes."

## PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Montana Code Annotated § 27-19-201 sets forth the standard Courts must follow when assessing a motion for a preliminary injunction. The statute provides, in relevant part, an injunction may be granted in the following circumstances:

- (1) when it appears that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief or any part of the relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually;
- (2) when it appears that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the applicant;
- (3) when it appears during the litigation that the adverse party is doing or threatens or is about to do or is procuring or suffering to be done some act in violation of the applicant's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual;

Nonetheless, in *Davis v. Westphal*, 2017 MT 276, ¶ 24, 389 Mont. 251, 405 P.3d 73, the Montana Supreme Court determined "even on proof of any grounds enumerated in § 27-19-201, MCA, a preliminary injunction should not issue absent an accompanying prima facie showing, or showing that it is at least uncertain, that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury prior to final resolution on the merits."

Montana Code Annotated § 27-19-103 provides that a court may not issue a preliminary injunction: "(4) to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit," or "(6) to prevent the exercise of a public . . . officer, in a lawful manner. . . ."

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A district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear declaratory actions regarding agency decisions where either the decision was not final, or the aggrieved party has not exhausted her administrative remedies. Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep't of Pub. Serv. Reg., 2005 MT 84, ¶ 14, 326 Mont. 416, 110 P.3d 20. "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Goodman Realty, Inc. v. Monson, 267 Mont. 228, 231, 883 P.2d 121, 123 (1994). A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief. McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp., 2010 MT 24, ¶ 12, 355 Mont. 120, 225 P.3d 1221. In other words, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate the plaintiff does not have a claim. Buttrell v. McBride Land & Livestock Co., 170 Mont. 296, 298, 553 P.2d 407, 408 (1976). For these reasons, a trial court rarely grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If a complaint lacks specificity, further discovery may be the appropriate remedy, rather than dismissal. McKinnon, ¶ 24.

#### **ANALYSIS**

# **Motion for Preliminary Injunction**

Plaintiffs' motion is unwarranted. First, upon review of the record, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not met the threshold criteria demonstrating they will suffer irreparable injury before their rights can be fully litigated.

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Second, Montana law precludes a district court from issuing an injunction to prevent an agency from executing a statute or to prevent a public officer from exercising his duties. Third, Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies. DEQ has not made a final decision in this matter.

Plaintiffs have not met their burden by showing they will likely suffer irreparable harm if the Court doesn't grant their motion for a preliminary injunction. In the event DEQ suspends Plaintiffs' exploration licenses and operating permits, Plaintiffs argue they "will suffer immediate and great irreparable injury." Plaintiffs further argue that revocation of the permits would devalue Hecla's assets and cause great uncertainty to the company's operations. They claim the suspension of operating permits would force Plaintiffs to cease daily reclamation activities. Based upon the evidence before the Court, however, these scenarios remain hypothetical and fail to establish irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction.

Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate DEQ will seek to revoke the permits and licenses unless the Court intervenes by granting Plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction. The record simply does not support this claim. Counsel for DEQ repeatedly maintain the agency is not looking to suspend any permit or license at this stage of the proceeding. DEQ's violation letter suggests courses of action it may take and invites response and discussion. The letter acknowledges DEQ has the authority to suspend licenses under the MMRA, but the letter is neither a formal nor informal decision to suspend a permit. The record is devoid of any indication DEQ is or, in the near future, will seek to revoke or nullify Plaintiffs' permits.

Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate DEQ's actions would cause imminent, irreparable harm, Montana Code Annotated § 27-19-103 precludes this Court from granting an injunction "to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit" or "to prevent the exercise of a public . . . office, in a lawful manner." Both scenarios are at issue here.

It appears that by sending the violation letter, DEQ was merely executing the MMRA for a public benefit. Similarly, Director Livers was exercising his public office in a lawful manner when he notified Plaintiffs they might be in violation of the MMRA. Plaintiffs contend DEQ is either grossly misinterpreting the MMRA in such a manner as to make it unlawful, or the entire statute is unconstitutional and thus unlawful. These issues are the core of the declaratory judgment action, and the Court will not adjudicate them in a preliminary injunction motion. These arguments are premature.

### **Motion to Dismiss**

Defendants argue the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction in this matter because the DEQ has not issued a final administrative decision. A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear declaratory actions regarding agency decisions where either the decision was not final or the aggrieved party has not exhausted its administrative remedies. *Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep't of Pub. Serv. Reg.*, 2005 MT 84, ¶ 14, 326 Mont. 416, 110 P.3d 20. "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

This case is premature. Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies. The DEQ letter at issue here does not constitute a final decision. Montana Code Annotated § 82-4-361 establishes the procedures by

which DEO addresses alleged violations. DEO is required to send a violation letter, but may also issue an order, which becomes final thirty days after issuance if there is no response from the alleged violator. DEO has not issued an order in this case or issued a final decision. When an agency has not issued a final decision, there is no justiciable controversy. Brisendine v. Dept. of Commerce, 253 Mont. 361, 365, 833 P.2d 1019, 1021.

Plaintiffs have also failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under Montana Code Annotated § 82-4-361 and the Montana Administrative Procedures Act. District courts lack subject matter jurisdiction for judicial review of administrative actions where the complaining party has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. *Mountain Water*, ¶ 14. Pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), having determined that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants' motion to dismiss is warranted.

Accordingly,

### **ORDER**

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

DATED this 1/2 day of December 2018.

MIKE MENAHAN

District Court Judge

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