Assessing Technology for Policy Makers

Barry Kellman

The congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is approaching the end of its first year of operation. Already, it is drawing considerable attention from environmental groups, and for good reason.

Industrialization has made technological solutions a favorite panacea. Nuclear power generation, for instance, is offeed as a solution to increased power needs. Such solutions, however, bring heavy costs as well as great benefits. These costs include physical and psychological harm to man, which are expensive to mitigate or rectify where they are not in fact irreparable. The solution to the problems caused by new technologies can be neither a romantic attempt to stop the hands of the clock nor a blind, devil-take-the-hindmost embrace of all progress. It must involve a thorough exploration of the probable consequences of various actions and developments.

Technology assessment (T.A.) is a problem-solving process designed to allow policy-makers to understand the direct and indirect consequences of technological innovations before it becomes too late to make wise decisions on their application. In the words of Emilio Dad-dario, congressional father of OTA and its first Director:

"It (T.A.) is a mechanism for improving decisions that has become essential to efficiency and safety in today's era of technology. It is institutionalization of a methodology for previewing potential effects of technological developments so that the informtion generated may increase our ability to forestall the detrimental effects and encourage the beneficial effects of our inventions."¹

It was in this spirit that the Technology Assessment Act of 1972² was passed. The act established the OTA "for Congress as an aid in the identification and consideration of existing and probable impacts of technological application." OTA is the first independent congressional office established since the General Accounting Office came into being almost fifty years ago.

OTA's year of quiet study is coming to a close, and the office is making its first efforts toward carving itself a place in the Capitol. A report on the bioequivalency of drugs is now nearing completion, a project concerning solar energy has been started, and other projects in such diverse areas as mass transit, agriculture, and the oceans are in preliminary stages. General rules and procedures are being codified, and a staff is being formed.

At a time when OTA is just beginning to become fully functional, it is appropriate to assess its prospects for contributing to environmental policy. T.A. has the potential for being a powerful asset to the environmental movement, and OTA can serve to implement the T.A. methodology. In the past, T.A. could have been employed to determine conclusively the long-range costs of the supersonic transport, DDT, nuclear power, and other innovations, processes, and substances with possibly devastating environmental impacts. Environmentalists won battles against some of these dangers and lost others. Many were subject to congressional debates in which there was scant and conflicting evidence on long-range consequences. Fuller information on these consequences could have saved a great deal of effort and might possibly have reversed the ultimate decisions in some cases. Even at present, Congress facing decisions on the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR), on energy supply through new sources such as solar energy, on off-shore drilling, on strip-mining and on other important environmental issues. It is the thesis of this note that environmentalists should seek technological assessments of these proposals, and, more importantly, that environmentalists should support a role for OTA in performing these assessments.

Environmentalists are currently engaged in deciding how best to work with OTA. Some have urged that the Office be treated as an ingovernment advocate for environmental and other public interest concerns. This note urges that OTA be viewed not as a potential advocate but as a source of neutral judgments on technology unavailable from any other source, and untainted by position-taking. It will explore in some depth the relationship between technology assessment as a discipline and the efforts of OTA to show why OTA can be most effective by adopting this broader perspective. Part I provides a brief description of OTA's history and structure; it also discusses OTA's interface with the legislative process. Part II delineates the purpose and function of technology assessment in theoretical terms so as to develop a construct for evaluating OTA's work. Part III then measures OTA's activities and projects to date against the analytical prerequisites established by the technology assessment discipline.

PART I

OTA's History and Structure

Interest in technology assessment grew out of recent congressional debates in which opponents of various technological programs, particularly the supersonic transport, attempted to measure and forecast the consequences of the proposed new technology. In some cases, the objectors forced alterations in the program; in others they succeeded in having it rejected altogether. Yet those who supported such programs generally had access to more extensive expertise to validate their viewpoint. These disputes over consequences of proposed new technologies [4 ELR 50067] had two effects: (1) they escalated the pressures on both sides for higher levels of technical expertise, and (2) they made Congressmen the judges of technical debates without the expertise necessary for informed decision making.

The Executive Branch has, for many years, developed and regulated technology through its administrative agencies. Congress did not begin to take an active role in the subject until 1966.In that year the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, chaired by Congressman Emilio Daddario, (D-Conn) reported that an early warning system for developments in technology would be an asset to Congress.³ On March 7, 1967, Daddario submitted legislation providing for the establishment of a technology assessment board to furnish both Congress and the Executive with neeeded technical information. Although the bill failed, Daddario's subcommittee commissioned four studies on the subject⁴ which furthered interest in the idea. Daddario held more hearings in 1969 and 1970, and these efforts were finally rewarded with passage of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972.

The Act establishes a Technology Assessment Board (Board) consisting of six Senators and six Representatives, equally divided between the two parties with the Director of OTA as a non-voting member. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) presently chairs the Board and Representative Charles Mosher (R-Ohio) sits as Vice-Chairman. These positions have two year terms, and alternate between Senators and Representatives. The Board determines which projects OTA will undertake and has authority to determine OTA's policies and procedures. In the original House bill, the Board was designed to include representatives of both Congress and the Executive, with some members Presidential appointees. However, Congress determined it wanted a source of technical expertise independent of the Executive Branch.⁵ As one commentator stated:

"Congressional frustrations in obtaining technical information have mounted rapidly since the Nixon administration took office and became embroiled in bitter dog-fights with Congress over the ABM and the SST. Historically, Congress has had virtually no technical expertise among its members or staff…. In the past, Capitol Hill has had to rely on the executive agencies for technical information. Furthermore, under the Nixon administration, the executive agencies are less cooperative in handing out data in answer to Congressional requests. This trend is creating pressure within the Congress to set up a technical information service of its own."⁶

The act also establishes a Technology Assessment Advisory Council (T.A.A.C.) composed of ten technical experts appointed by the Board plus the Comptroller General and the Director of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. The function of the T.A.A.C. is to recommend assessments to OTA, review work in progress, and evaluate the assessments when they are completed.⁷ It also serves to supplement the inhouse expertise and to provide direct contacts to the GAO and CRS.

Former Representative Daddario, having lost his seat in Congress before final passage of the act, was named OTA's first director in late 1973. He heads a staff which will ultimately number about forty professionals and twenty clerical workers.⁸ The inhouse staff will not perform all the assessments itself but in most instances will contract out its projects. The staff's function is to determine the requirements of contracted-out research, select the contracting organization, monitor and evaluate the work, and finally prepare the report as submitted by the contractor for transmittal to Congress. No report will pass directly from the contractor to the Congress. The staff may also provide technical information for the Board, Advisory Council, or Congress itself either by offering information or suggesting persons who could be contacted or used for their expertise.

OTA estimates that only about 25 percent of the projects will be completed inhouse.⁹ These inhouse studies will involve the use of advisory panels of specialists in the field acting as consultants for a particular project. The panels will have no long-term connection to OTA, except that some panels may serve on a continuing basis if a subject area becomes the source of a continuous flow of projects. By action of OTA's Board, projects and staff are presently distributed among six task forces in the following subject areas: energy, food, health, material resources, oceans, and transportation. While these are only general labels, they indicate the focus of OTA's projects in the near future.

The specific functions of panels and of the T.A.A.C., as well as the proportion of projects to be completed inhouse, [4 ELR 50068] are questions which will be resolved with the passage of time and the accumulation of experience. Such experience should begin to accrue now that OTA's budgetary problems have been at least partially resolved. Congress refused to provide OTA a temporary appropriation in June 1973 to carry it over until it received its appropriations for the 1974 fiscal year.¹⁰ As a result, OTA received no funds until November 1973, when it was allocated $2 million, approximately half the level of funding it had requested. Thus, considerably less than a year has passed since Daddario assumed a paying position as Executive Director.

Much of the subsequent time has been used by Daddario to organize a staff and make OTA a working office.

At this point OTA plans to function as follows: requests for projects must come initially from congressional committee chairpersons; from these requests the Board together with the staff will determine which projects will be selected. The selection criteria are as yet unclear. Once a project is selected there are a number of courses open to OTA. A panel could be created on the subject with the assistance of the T.A.A.C., or it could be contracted out, or both. The exact input of the Board, the T.A.A.C., the panel (if any), and the staff, will vary from project to project. One factor is constant: the Board must review all results and decide how they will be presented to the congressional committee requesting the information.¹¹ This requirement puts full authority and responsibility for the shape of OTA's output in the hands of the Congressmen who serve on the Board.

It is noteworthy that criteria for determining what should be assesed, who should do it, and that relative inputs the public and the various component parts of OTA should have, are not explicitly set forth in the Technology Assessment Act. This omission may indicate a congressional intent to subject OTA to strict and continuing congressional scrutiny and to restrict its independence.¹² The most important feature of OTA's structure and position in the federal government is that it is an appendage of Congress and will consequently be subject to the political cross currents that flow through that body. This has led to some skepticism concerning the effect that OTA will have. One commentator has gone so far as to say:

"It is an empty vessel, a completely discretionary, standardless mechanism for providing the powers that be in Congress with information on technology…. It would be fatuous to pretend that the success of the OTA is anything less than completely dependent upon the good intentions of the powerful members of Congress."¹³

Another observer, reflecting the same fears, ties OTA's weaknesses more tightly to its structure as established by Congress:

"OTA has been constructed along lines that reflect the fact that Congress's various power centers do not relish the notion of technology assessors running loose on Capitol Hill. Consequently, the OTA itself will perform no technology assessments whatever — and thus nothing that comes out of its activities will bear the possibly prestigious imprint of an agency of Congress. OTA will simply be a contracting agency for ordering studies from outside organizations.¹⁴

To determine the extent to which these allegations are true, and if true, whether damning, a more in-depth look at the methodology of technology assessment is required.

PART II

Public Law 92-484, which established the Office of Technology Assessment, states that "[t]he basic function of the Office shall be to provide early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the applications of technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the Congress."¹⁵ Clearly OTA is to perform technology assessments, but what exactly is meant by T.A. is left unclear both by the act and by most of the writing done on the subject. One commentator has observed that the concept of technology assessment has begun to sound as marvelous as motherhood, except that in this case, no one knows how to get pregnant.

Much has been written on T.A., but the major theoretical work on the subject consists of four studies commissioned by Daddario's subcommittee, the Mitre Corporation's work on T.A. methodology, and a study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on the uses of T.A. This body of opinion portrays T.A. as a means to evaluate the possible results, both beneficial and harmful, of a technological development. T.A., according to virtually all writers on the subject, focuses upon (1) the primary structure of a technology, how it performs its intended functions; and (2) upon the other direct and indirect consequences of that technology. Ideally it should in addition, consider alternatives which may accomplish the same primary ends, and include social, political and economic costs and benefits.

The Purposes of T.A.

Technology assessment is still too much in its formative stages to permit a single objective definition. In practice, the characteristics of T.A. have varied according to its users and their purposes. The National Academy of Sciences, in a 1969 report to Daddario's subcommittee, entitled Technology: Process of Assessment and Choice, discussed several of the most commonly held perspectives regarding T.A.

[4 ELR 50069]

To the environmentalist, T.A. is often an expanded and highly detailed environmental impact analysis, measuring the costs and benefits of technological development upon physical systems of ecological concern.¹⁶ The social planner adds to this the concept of measuring impacts with a view to directing or changing them.¹⁷ To a legislator, T.A. may be a means of evaluating proposed statutes, both for their probable impact and for effectiveness in achieving specific policy goals.¹⁸ The NAS also considers the perspective of the "futurologist" (one who studies the probable course of future development), for whom T.A. is a means of deciding how best to allocate society's resources.¹⁹ Francois Hetman, writing for the Organization for Economic Development, agrees that both the measurement of impacts and the study of the future are within the definition of T.A., but asserts that the viewpoint of the planner most closely conforms to the ideal conception of technology assessment. This view stresses the cross-disciplinary evaluation of technologies in the context of specified political goals, and implies tat T.A. must be a part of the planning functions of all political bodies, and of legislatures in particular.²⁰

Realistically, however, it must be noted that legislatures — and the U.S. Congress is no exception — tend to react to crises as they arise, rather than to engage in long-term policy planning. The reaction time, moreover, is often long, owing to the nature of the political process.²¹ Even if technology assessment is used in legislative decision-making, there remains the question of the stage at which it should be employed. The commentators on T.A. are virtually unanimous in urging that T.A. be used only after underlying political decisions have been made by the people's elected representatives. This view stems largely from a fear of spawning a technocracy which could usurp decision-making power. On the other hand, the legislature cannot and should not decide important policy questions in a vacuum of knowledge, so that some degree of technology assessment should be performed and made available before crucial choices are made.²²

The Analytical Approach to Technology Assessment

A person assessing a new technology may approach the analysis from one of three points of view. First, he may respond to a particular problem as it arises as a result of a new technology. This is the "problem-initiated approach;" it is natural to legislators. In such a case the analysis is likely to identify negative aspects of the technology for the present and immediate future only; the approach will concentrate on the negative aspects of the technology. The weakness of this point of view is that it tends not to examine the ramifications of the situation in their entirety; it responds only to the problem. It also tends to be a short term approach. This "problem-initiated approach" traces the cause-effect relationships symptomatic of the problems but doesn't question the validity of the technological process.²³

The National Academy of Science and the National Academy of Engineering believe that where there is a first-order problem — a specific technological prodcess is having a direct and primary negative impact — the problem-initiated approach may be of considerable use.²⁴ An apt example of this approach is the environmental impact statement. An EIS describes what problems will be created by pursuing a certain technological development. If these problems are significant, then action can be taken to change or stop the program. This focus upon effects rather than causes is useful when applied only in the context of environmental protection, the nature of which is primarily regulatory. As a result, this approach is sufficient for accomplishing the goal of environmental protection or other single goals. However, when the policy-maker is attempting to plan and is concerned also about the causes of problems, the one-dimensional nature of the "problem-initiated approach" is insufficient.²⁵

A second approach to assessing new technologies begins from within the particular technological process under consideration; the constraints and requirements of the process are the starting point. The analysis focuses on the process itself. In contrast to the "problem-initiated approach" this second type of assessment, termed "technology initiated," deals with all the possible ramifications of a new technology rather than just one troublesome feature. This is the "technology initiated approach."

Technology-initiated analysis is beginning to be used in some executive agencies, particularly those concerned with development. It has not been significantly used in Congress. The approach tends to be broader because it attempts to deal with all the possible impacts, both positive and negative. For this reason regulation is less appropriate as a legislative response since many ramifications may be positive. Planning which may or may not incorporate regulatory actions replaces mere regulation as the legislative response. The complexity of this approach increases as the higher-order consequences of a technology are explored and the options created by these consequences are realized.²⁶ The technology-initiated approach helps the [4 ELR 50070] planner to determine what policies could be socially desirable in the long-term on the bases of a thorough exploration of their positive and negative consequences.²⁷

The teleological framework, or goal-oriented analysis, is a third possible kind of technology assessment. According to the OECD, the most significant distinguishing feature between this approach and the two previously mentioned is that analysis begins with a statement of the broad policy or technological objective which forms the end-purpose of the project. The statement of an objective leads to a determination of what are the technological options available to obtain it. Those options which seem most promising are subjected to a full technology-initiated assessment with one important addition: the assessor will supplement theusual criteria with a consideration of the proposal's potential for leading toward the desired end-state. Hence, this step is slightly broader than a technology-initiated analysis. Processes and consequences are evaluated within the context of a larger purpose as well as traced and measured. Finally, a choice among the options must be made in light of political considerations as well as technological evaluations of feasibility.²⁸

If T.A.'s ultimate purpose as described earlier is to be fulfilled, then this last framework is probably the approach which those making use of T.A. should attempt to take. Its main advantage is that objectives are used to govern the choice of technological options rather than being governed by them. Hence, the planning process can be more independent of present technological capabilities. However, the teleological approach requires a well-defined and commonly accepted policy objective. Where an objective is not defined, this method runs the risk of being either vague or else forcing the final choice of options to be purely a technological choice instead of a political determination. T.A. users could opt for the technology-initiated approach to avoid these problems. The technology-initiated approach is comprehensive enough to avoid the pitfalls of the problem-initiated approach and does include features necessary to the planner or policy-maker. Yet those responsible for performing T.A. would do planners and policy-makers a service by incorporating a teleological approach whenever a clear objective may be identified.

A General T.A. Methodology

The methodology of T.A. has been the subject of extensive developmental thought, ranging from highly technical monographs (of which the Mitre Corporation's work probably stands as the best example) to Emilio Daddario's recitation of the general steps which comprise the T.A. process. Daddario has offered a simple T.A. procedure that involves six steps.²⁹ His proposal is sufficiently detailed to stand as a point of departure for this discussion.

The first step is identification of the objectives sought by the policy-makers. This step is most crucial when the telelogical approach is being used because its determination forms the central thrust of the entire process. Yet these objectives are necessary to the formation of the process of the assessment even when using the technology-initiated approach.

Step two is identification of the scope of the assessment. This involves determining what systems will be examined and what time frame will be covered. The systems encompassed within the analysis should include social as well as technological systems. Determining the time frame requires two decisions: (1) how far into the future should the assessors examine, and (2) what different time periods should be analysed more or less extensively.

Step three is very similar to step two and would probably be done simultaneously. It is the identification of the sectors of the society affected by the technology and hence by any policy regarding that technology. An assessor must first ascertain what groups and institutions in the society are affected and should be of concern to the decision-maker. This leads to a more specific examination of producer-consumer and other transactions created by the technology, and allows the assessor to weight the economic issues inherent in any policy in the context of costs and benefits.

Step four is identification of alternatives to the technology being assessed. This is crucial under either the teleological or technology-initiated approach. The identification of alternatives is a means of informing the policy-maker of possible options for obtaining the same primary end but with different higher-order consequences. This step can also pave the way for further assessments in the area to explore alternatives which seem most promising.

Step five is the most important part of the assessment process: making a cost/benefit analysis of the technology in question. This begins with an assessment of the primary costs and benefits, including those of alternatives not taken, if the policy-maker pursues the technology being assessed. Indirect and external costs and benefits must then be weighed for both the assessed technology and its alternatives. Finally, social costs and benefits must be assessed. Confusion of economic and non-economic costs plus consideration of similar costs at different points in time adds to the complexity of this process. Most cost/benefit analyses are conducted according to the principle of overall net utility which attempts to evaluate all costs and benefits on a common scale (usually in dollar terms). This then allows the policy maker to choose policies which will maximize benefits while minimizing costs. The difficult part of this analysis, however, is to quantify correctly social costs and benefits in monetary terms.Yet, this task is absolutely necessary if T.A. is to [4 ELR 50071] fulfill its major function of assessing technological developments in their larger social context.

The last step in this process is presentation to the policy-maker of the results of the first five steps along with criteria for selection of a policy choice. The assessor should not overstep the bounds of objectively when presenting conclusions and developing the criteria through which a choice should be made. But, this may prove difficult if recommendations are to be included in the assessment. This pitfall can probably be avoided if assessors realize that the assessment process ends before the decision-making process begins. If recommendations for policy choices are presented, then all ramifications of the proposals must be expressed in as objective a manner as possible.

Technology assessment in its full-blown form requires considerable effort even to comprehend. If in some respects it rings of the overplanning and rigidity of 1984, it should be borne in mind that T.A. is available for the use of Congress on terms set by Congress; there is little likelihood it will be allowed to overstep this limited role. At most, it may suffer from a tendency by Congressmen to use the conclusions of OTA not only to aid them in their own decisions, but to help them in persuading others of the justifiability and wisdom of their own choice.

PART III

OTA's Activities and Projects to Date

OTA is moving with a substantial degree of caution in carving out its work. The Offfice is young, under-financed, viewed as suspect by some elements of industry and business, and has been largely ignored to date by most members of Congress. On the other hand, some public interest groups have hailed it as a protector against the evils of modern society. The fact that almost fifty requests for projects were received from Congress in the first six months of OTA's operations has given supporters of OTA some grounds for confidence. But since the Office is often disregarded, especially when major political issues such as energy policy or weaponry arise, such confidence remains less than firm.

OTA is presently making decisions regarding the assessment process which could determine both the scope and nature of its later activity. The Office is doing so through work on seven projects in the six subject areas of health, transportation, food, material resources, energy, and oceans, that were established by the Board. Only two of these areas — energy and oceans — directly involve environmental concerns. Yet all of OTA's work is of interest indirectly in the sense that together, these projects provide a picture of the work that OTA is and most probably will be doing. Each of these projects therefore will be examined individually to determine what approach is being used and to what extent the assessment methods described in Part II are being followed.

Health³⁰

The project that is nearest to completion (the contractors' report is now due at OTA) deals with the bioequivalency of drugs. The purpose of the study is to investigate the possibility that drugs with the same chemical composition but produced under different conditions have different effects upon the body.

The bioequivalency project is a problem-initiated assessment. OTA did not design it to examine the technology of manufacturing drugs, much less to examine how medical care in general could be improved through alterations in the methods by which medications are produced. Rather, a specific question arose requiring technical expertise, and OTA will provide an answer. Although there are a number of factors involved in the broader aspect of the question of bioequivalency, the study will focus on the equivalency issue. There is no over-all policy objective to which this study will contribute. It is not T.A., but rather an exercise in measuring chemical effects. While the information which the study will produce is no doubt needed, this task falls short of the level of work that OTA should be undertaking.

Transportation

OTA has drafted two project statements in the field of mass transit. The first is an evaluation of Automatic Train Control (ATC) systems.³¹ Its purpose is to provide information on the issue of what federal legislation should be enacted to further rapid transit system automation, and it will focus on the technology of ATC in order to determine the relative costs and benefits of competing systems. This project also uses the problem-initiated approach. All that is being assessed is one facet of a technology with the intent of determining which process has the greatest benefits for the least direct costs. Both the time frame and the scope of inquiry are extremely limited; in fact, the project deals with little more than an accounting of the state of the art as measured by technical feasibility. There is no overall policy objective to which this information will contribute nor any serious analysis of the higher order consequences of the systems under examination.

The second mass transit project is an evaluation of the processes used by local communities to plan and choose new rapid transit systems.³² This study is limited to examining the decision-making process, and does not include an evaluation of the systems chosen. The project thus focuses on what is being done rather than what could or should be done. OTA will analyze which features of the rapid transit systems are considered important by the local authorities, including technical feasibility, availability, level of performance, social impacts, and [4 ELR 50072] other indirect costs and benefits that a city may choose to consider.³³ Yet the object of this research is not to assess the systems being used, but instead to assess the political evaluation of those systems and thereby gain insights into local decision-making processes. While assessing a decision-making process may be fascinating, it can hardly be called T.A.

Food³⁴

The agriculture project is an assessment of agricultural information systems (AIS). It appears to be an example of T.A. as it should be performed. Its general objective is that alternative AIS must be developed in order to maximize agricultural production and the efficiency of farm goods distribution. The prospectus goes on to delineate nine specific objectives ranging from identifying agricultural relationships to informing Congress on how new AIS should be used in its policy-making processes. OTA describes the scope of the work and the affected groups and institutions (steps two and three of the T.A. methodology) by identifying six policy areas for investigation. These range from the effect of the international food system to the effect upon natural resources of certain uses of land and certain pesticides.

It is after these descriptions that the prospectus gives twelve assessment tasks as a means of fulfilling the previously enumerated objectives. These tasks form a step by step example of how a problem should be addresed using T.A.:

1. Classify important agricultural information

2. Identify evaluation of AIS

3. Investigate data collection technologies

4. Investigate information analysis tools

5. Investigate information integration, communication and use by policy-makers

6. Report of deficiencies of present AIS

7. Identify technologies for improving AIS

8. Apply remedies to information deficiencies in the international food policy areas

9. Do cost/effectiveness analysis of alternatives as applied to policy objectives

10. Identify social, economic and institutional consequences of proposed alternatives

11. Report on alternatives and prepare options for Congress

12. Report on how Congress can better use AIS for its functions.

This project is a teleological-approach assessment.Its detailed objectives, incorporation of alternatives at each stage and broad scope exemplify the type of work that OTA should do. The project has a scope of inquiry narrow enough for thorough investigation — as opposed to an assessment of general agriculture policy — yet broad enough to be of significant use in planning future agricultural programs.

Material Resources³⁵

A project in the subject area of material resources is not yet at the prospectus-writing stage. OTA has developed only a general indication of four assessment projects. The first is a study of the materials information system. This resembles the first step in the agriculture project.The second project involves a study of the possibilities of energy conservation through better management of materials. Both the third and fourth projects deal with the question of how to protect the United States' material supply from foreign producers who might cut off parts of that supply for political reasons. One plans to examine where the United States' materials supply is vulnerable to such cut-offs and what can be done to increase the availability of those materials from other sources. The other will examine how reserves or buffer stocks of materials may be developed to afford protection in case of a cut-off.

None of these projects meet the criteria of a full application of T.A. The first two represent preliminary studies which could possibly form the basis of a later assessment. The last two do have the objective of attempting to ascertain alternatives to reliance upon foreign supplies of materials. Yet they lack a systematic approach to the problem which would establish the project's approach and scope.

Energy³⁶

The project on solar energy is probably the most important current OTA project to environmentalists for a number of reasons. It is inherently a subject which deals with environmental concerns since it will evaluate the development of solar energy as an alternative energy source to fossil fuels. More importantly, it is at the stage of development where environmentalists can have a significant input. The project was contracted out only recently and is just in the beginning stages of research.

The project will assess the feasibility and impacts of using solar energy as a means of producing on-site electric power. The time frame for analysis ranges roughly from 1980-2000, but the major focus will be on the next ten years. The project will examine the state of technological development both at present and in the future in order to determine the feasibility of using solar-electric power.Such use must then be evaluated against the costs for developing such a system. These costs are likely to increase as the time for development is decreased. Hence, cost/benefit analyses will have to be performed for several time spans. Measuring the economic costs of using alternative sources of energy (including fossil fuels and nuclear energy) is the last factor involved in the feasibility study. This last step, although crucial, may not be carried out for two reasons, however. The first is that it is only given a passing reference in the prospectus which [4 ELR 50073] seams to slight its significance. The second is that the budget for the project is low. A major portion of this assessment will be directed at analyzing the impacts of solar energy development.The factors to be examined will include employment, community organization, building codes and zoning, institutional considerations of governments and private groups possibly affected, environmental and land use values, and general economic principles of market equilibrium. Again, this is supposed to be done within the context of potential alternatives, but financial limitations may preclude a thorough examination of such alternatives.

The solar energy project is not as systematically described as the agriculture project. Yet it could represent a significant example of T.A. at work if the costs and benefits of both the feasibility and the impacts of using solar energy are assessed in comparison to the alternative sources of energy available. If a policy objective could be clearly determined and alternatives to solar energy measured, then it would be a stronger assessment. This would provide for a teleological approach, maximizing the objective while minimizing the costs, as well as informing policy-makers of that trade-offs have to be made.

Finally, it seems curious that OTA's solar energy project is its only effort in the entire field of energy policy. The President is preparing to transmit major initiatives in energy policy to Congress as a part of "Project Independence". Yet little if any response will come from OTA regarding Project Independence, relaxation of pollution-control standards, mining of oil shale, etc. OTA does not seem to be moving on the central issues in a technological area which is presently ripe for assessment. But it may be the very controversiality of those issues that is causing OTA's inaction.

Oceans

OTA's ocean assessment projects are at approximately the same stage of development as those concerning materials. One large project on coastal zone management is scheduled to be contracted out by December 31, 1974. Very little detail is presently available on this project. Three short-term studies are being planned in this area: (1) a study of ways to obtain better data on outer continental shelf oil and gas resources, (2) a study of possible procedures for allocating exploration and drilling rights for such resources, and (3) an evaluation of outer continental shelf oil and gas development technology. The three study projects are not T.A. projects. They are preliminary evaluations of certain topics which may make possible more comprehensive assessments at a later time. The validity of this approach is open to question; however, evaluating the work being done in this area seems premature.

Assessing the Assessments

Only five of the seven assessment projects are sufficiently formulated to analyze in much detail. OTA's work on material resources and oceans is, as yet, too ill-defined for thorough examination. The other five projects, however, begin to provide a basis for evaluating what OTA will do in the future.

An important measure of OTA's work is the extent to which the Office is using a teleological approach. Of the studies thus far undertaken, only the agriculture project clearly uses such an approach. It is unclear whether the stated policy objective for this task came from Congress as a part of the original request or was supplied by OTA. In either case, the presence of such an objective gives a structure and cohesion to the AIS project that is unmatched by any of the others. The solar energy project on the other hand is technology-initiated, and is therefore not structured within the context of stated policy objectives. Nonetheless, it is significant that the energy project assesses alternatives. The other studies are, at best, problem-initiated. The drug bioequivalency project and the two transit projects will be the first studies completed. Thus, the first projects that Congress will receive from OTA will be problem-initiated. These projects may well establish an undesirably low level of expectations in Congress for T.A. OTA will be far more useful to Congress if it can produce teleological, goal oriented assessments rather than studies of problems. The latter may serve as a step to the former, but they should not become replacements.

A second measure of OTA's performance is the extent to which OTA is following the standard T.A. methodology. This is partially determined by the approach OTA selects for a given project. All of the assessments have incorporated most of the steps of the T.A. process except for stating objectives and measuring alternatives. Only the agriculture project includes a clearly stated objective. An analysis of alternatives is present in the agriculture project and, although with less emphasis, in the solar energy and the Automatic Train Control systems projects; it is sadly lacking in the others.

A third factor is the extent to which OTA appears to be avoiding controversial subjects. There is no work in progress concerning military technology, outer space, air transportation, pesticides, or nuclear energy. The project which comes closest to being controversial is the solar energy work. Yet even that project does not address the major energy problems which Congress will have to face. Controversial subjects tend to become so because they have important and wide-ranging consequences. If OTA has received requests for assessments regarding such topics and is avoiding them for fear of angering some Congressmen, then the Office may be curtailing its usefulness. It is quite possible, however, that the projects which have been selected are the most appropriate and most feasible as beginning topics for OTA, reflecting a realistic sense of caution by the Office. There does not appear to be any way that OTA can avoid controversial technological issues for long and still become a worth-while resource for Congress. One of the major reasons for [4 ELR 50074] its creation was the desire in Congress to have input on subjects which were so controversial that unbiased information was difficult to obtain. OTA should address itself to the most important work available regardless of congressional interest on the subject. Any subtle constraints on this independence weaken OTA.

OTA has done well to date to steer clear of the tendency to become an advocate. The Office's task is to provide objective information to Congress to assist that body in its basic function of reaching decisions and chosing among alternative policies; Congress did not design OTA to be a part of that function. This has caused some conflict and misunderstanding between OTA and public interest groups who expected OTA to be more like an executive agency created to protect certain values.³⁷ The assessments in progress indicate that OTA is sticking carefully to its mandated function and completely avoiding any tendency to advocate which policies should be supported or rejected. To some extent this is consistent with its apparent desire for a non-controversial stance. The Office could focus on more controversial subjects and still maintain its non-normative perspective, but it could not become both controversial and normative and survive.

It is difficult to fault OTA for its failure to date to undertake holistic analysis. The Office has limited its efforts to looking at small segments of a particular technology. The projects in progress indicate that, at least for the present, OTA is not about to examine a technology as a whole process (e.g. assessing military hardware technology or mass transit technology), and there are good reasons for this. It is difficult to perform a holistic analysis of a technology on a budget of $4 million per year and a staff of forty professionals. OTA has to produce projects (although the pressure for "results" has been tempered by congressional concern that OTA find its way carefully), and measurements and assessments of an application or single aspect of a technology are easier to do than sweeping examinations of a technological area. Finally, Congress legislates incrementally. Even if a report could be done cheaply and quickly on a broad scope, it is doubtful that it would be of much use to Congress' legislative functions. OTA's staff seems aware of this fact and is attempting to service Congressional needs. Yet T.A. was designed for broad planning, not incremental decision-making. It should be done holistically to the greatest extent possible. Blame for OTA's failure to conduct holistic analysis should be placed on Congress, not on OTA.

Finally, it is important to realize that OTA has had to face barriers to meeting the further objective of assisting Congress in exercising an expanded planning role. The first is the fact that Congress has failed to provide clear statements of goals for projects proposed for OTA study. As a result, OTA is producing information on scattered subjects as questions arise and are presented to it. For OTA to help Congress plan Congress itself must want to plan, and it has shown little tendency in that direction. OTA's function is to inform Congress of some of the technological consequences of actual or proposed programs. Yet even this is limited by the second barrier put before OTA, the Office's lack of money, personnel, and credibility. The lack of money and personnel minimize the amount, depth, and breadth of the work that OTA will do. The lack of credibility limits the impact that OTA's work will have. It seems likely that as OTA finishes more projects, its prestige will rise. This could also lead to a raise in its level of support and staffing. But such growth may only allow for OTA to provide more and higher quality scattered information. Essentially, the fulfillment of the purpose of T.A. by OTA is a challenge which rests with Congress. It is doubtful that OTA can aid in the planning of technological development in accordance with social and political goals without an explicit congressional commitment or enunciation of what these goals are.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Technology assessment is a relatively new concept; the term was first mentioned in Congress in 1966. Yet by 1972, the idea had enough support to enable the passage of the Technology Assessment Act. The Act created OTA, which now consists of the technology assessment board, advisory council, and staff. Many of the assessment projects assigned to OTA will be contracted out to research firms. In those cases, OTA will only supervise and coordinate the final product and most of the OTA's current budget of $4 million is earmarked for such contracts. The criteria for choosing assessment subjects are still unclear, but all topics must come from congressional committee chairmen and must be approved by the Board. To date, OTA has made a cautious start for which there are numerous explanations.

T.A. is an examination of technological processes in order to determine their possible higher-order consequences. It aids the social planner by measuring and forecasting consequences and by putting such eventualities in the context of a policy objective. Hence, T.A. should be part of any political planning process. Yet T.A. should not remove political choices from legislators. It is a tool to be used by them, not a replacement for them. T.A. can approach an issue from three perspectives. The problem-initiated approach is limited and fails to examine the higher-order consequences of technologies. The technology-initiated approach does not have these failings, [4 ELR 50075] but it lacks consideration of a policy objective. The teleological approach is best but may be difficult to use in some cases. The methodology to be used in the latter two approaches involves a cost/benefit analysis which incorporates social factors as well as costs and benefits of alternatives.

OTA is conducting seven assessments, and only one of the seven uses a teleological approach. Most of the projects lack a clear policy objective and fail to incorporate an analysis of alternatives. The majority of the assessments, including those to be completed first, are problem-initiated, and OTA's work avoids controversial issues and holistic analysis. Both of these last two failings may stem from an insufficiency of staff and money, or on the other hand, they may simply indicate that OTA is attempting to deal realistically with Congress. OTA has not attempted to be normative and shows no intention of doing so in the future; it is attempting only to provide information. OTA has to overcome the failure of Congress to state policy goals as well as limitations on its budget. Both barriers have impeded OTA's ability to fulfill the objectives of T.A.

Conclusion: Implications for Environmentalists

OTA's basic function is to aid Congress, primarily by providing that body, on request, with assessments of alternative solutions to technological problems. OTA is not a regulatory agency in any sense of the term, nor is the Office intended to take on the role of an advocate for the adoption or rejection of any of the technological alternatives it assesses.

Some environmentalists and public interest advicates view OTA as a potential force for counteracting and regulating the negative aspects of technological developments and industrial growth. If OTA holds to its intended course, and there are no indications it will not, then these public interest advocates are bound to be disappointed. There is certainly merit to the argument that an advocate for restraint in the application of new technologies is needed. OTA as presently constituted, however, is not the agency to meet such a need.

Disappointment with OTA's neutral role may, however, be misguided. It is in some ways preferable that OTA remain a congressional research body rather than an advocate or an executive regulatory agency. A regulatory agency would not be involved with planning and would be consistently limited to using the problem-initiated approach in all of its work. OTA at least has the opportunity to do broader based planning to the extent that Congress desires to make use of the Office.

This last point focuses on the real problem confronting OTA, and with using T.A. as an environmental protection device in general. Congress is not well suited to play a planning role nor to use T.A. as a means of raising the quality of governmental policy. Congress instead is immersed in making incremental decisions on policies which come before it. OTA was formed with the understanding that it would provide unbiased information on technological issues.Any activity which goes beyond this function will have to be done in spite of Congress, a very difficult challenge for a new arm of the Legislative Branch. All this is not to excuse OTA for performing problem-oriented assessments without regard to alternatives or policy objectives. The quality of its work and to some extent the selection of assessment topics can certainly be brought more into line with the broader T.A. approach. But to expect OTA to produce more than Congress itself can use may not be appropriate.

Assessing technological developments is a vital step in environmental protection, as is planning future policies with due and knowledgeable regard for their consequences. OTA has a small and possibly growing role in each of these functions. Environmentalists can have some input into OTA in the present formative stages, yet the Office can be only as environmentally effective as the Congress permits. In essence, no responsibility has shifted, no new avenues have been opened, and no more planning will be done now than before. OTA can have a great impact but only if environmentalists and others force Congress to allow it to do so.

1. Hearings on S.2302 and H.R. 10243 before the Subcomm. on Computer Services of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 92d Cong. 2nd Sess. 72 (1972).

2. 2 US.C. §§ 471 et seq., Pub. L. 92-484, Oct. 13, 1972.

3. National Academy of Sciences, Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice, Report to the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969).

4. (a) Id.

(b) National Academy of Engineering, A Study of Technology Assessment, Report to the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969).

(c) National Academy of Public Administration, A Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch, Report to the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).

(d) Science Policy Research Div. of the Legislative Reference Service of the Lib. of Cong., Technical Information for Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 91-137, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969).

5. Speth, "The Federal Role in Technology Assessment and Control" in Federal Environmental Law, Sims (Ed.), 420 (1974).

6. Shapley, "Office of Technology Assessment: Congress Smiles, Scientists Wince," 175 Science 970 (1972).

7. Technology Assessment Act of 1972, supra, n.2.

8. Hearings on H.R. 7447 and H.R. 6691 before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. 33 (1973).

9. Prediction offered by Buford Macklin of O.T.A.

10. Hearings on H.R. 7447 and H.R. 6691, supra, n. 8.

11. Technology Assessment Act of 1972, supra, n. 2.

12. This is sharply denied by OTA staff members. It should be recognized that discussion of the relationship between OTA and Congress is, at this stage, speculation based on viewing OTA activity.

13. Speth, supra, n. 5, at 456.

14. Science and Government Report, Oct. 1, 1972, at 1.

15. Supra, n. 2.

16. National Academy of Sciences, supra, n 3, at 3.

17. Id. at 4.

18. Id. at 5.

19. Id.

20. Hetman, Society and the Assessment of Technology, 63 (1973).

21. Green, Technology Assessment and the Law, 36 G.W. L. Rev. 1037 (1968).

22. Hetman, supra, n. 20, at 352.

23. Id. at 98.

24. National Academy of Engineering, supra, n. 4(b), at 15.

25. Tribe, Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and Control of Technology, 9 Minerva 243 (1971).

26. Hetman, supra, n. 20, at 96.

27. National Academy of Engineering, supra, n 4(b), at 16.

28. Hetman, supra, n. 20, at 101.

29. Daddario, Technology Assessment — A Legislative View, 36 G.W. L. Rev. 1057 (1968).

30. See Science and Government Report, Apr. 15, 1974, at 2.

31. OTA Statement of Work, May 27, 1974.

32. Id.

33. Id.

34. OTA Statement of Work, May 16, 1974.

35. OTA Statement of Work, May 14, 1974.

36. Dr. Ronald Larson who heads this project has stressed that environmentalists should participate by submitting information or opinions.

37. There are pronounced differences between statements regarding T.A. issued by the National Council for Public Assessment of Technology and the views which emerge from the various congressional hearings on the subject of OTA. Staff members of OTA seem very conscious of this difference and are concerned about what is being said by public interest groups.