Self-Regulation--Has Its Time Come?

Self-Regulation—Has Its Time Come?

Al Iannuzzi

Al Iannuzzi, Ph.D, is employed by Johnson & Johnson as an executive director in the WorldWide Environmental Affairs group where he leads the Pharmaceutical Environment Group, regulatory compliance/outreach initiatives, environmental cost-accounting, and remediation. He is an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001-certified lead auditor and is the author of INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE (Lewis Publishers 2002), available at http://www.crcpress.com. He can be reached via e-mail at [email protected].

[33 ELR 10917]

The environmental movement has come a long way since the first half of the 20th century, when such forward thinkers as John Muir and Aldo Leopold helped shape worldwide environmental policy with their articles and books on preservation. Despite their good intentions, rapid industrialization still resulted in a slew of nightmares: Love Canal; Times Beach; the air pollution episodes of the 1960s; and Bhopal, India. But Muir and Leopold would at least take some comfort in the fact that legislators reacted by passing tough regulations like the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).¹

Environmental regulation grew exponentially from the first days of the modern environmental movement in the 1970s to the present. At the same time, state and federal enforcement agencies were formed to ensure compliance with the regulations. This type of oversight has resulted in cleaner air, water, and land. For industry, the reality has been coping with volumes of new regulations, which has led to a greening movement of sorts. Many companies have even become proactive, implementing pollution prevention programs and trying to design out hazardous materials from their products and processes. Over time, a once unthinkable thing has occurred: environmental groups, once traditional adversaries with industry, have in some instances chosen to partner with companies.

Despite many changes since the beginning of the movement, it seems that we are still operating in a 1980s paradigm, where there was blatant disregard for recently enacted regulations. The questions are: considering the many positive changes that have occurred, should we be doing things differently? Should we stay the course or is it time for change?

Think tanks and various environmental organizations have published a myriad of reports critiquing our environmental management program, claiming it is time for a change in direction. Resources for the Future, a public policy research organization, maintains that the laws are complex, unrelated to each other, and lack a long-term vision. They conclude that though many environmental advances have been made, the system is deeply and fundamentally flawed.²

It is also important to keep in mind that the Clinton Administration embarked on a reinvention initiative. One can only assume that the Administration was not pleased with the current system; otherwise, there would be no need for it to be "reinvented." A major part of the initiative was Project XL, a program designed to skirt the rigidity of the current system and allow firms to reduce pollutants in a commonsense way. Carol Browner, the former Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has called the current environmental regulatory scheme "a complex and unwieldy system of laws and regulations and increasing conflict and gridlock."³

Is there anyone in the environmental field who can honestly say they understand all the requirements listed in the state and federal environmental codes? For example, I just received a five-inch-thick book about RCRA, which is designed to help simplify compliance. The book covers what amounts to a single regulation. Even after reading guidance books like this, I wonder if I have overlooked something or didn't interpret the regulation properly. The complexity of the existing regulatory system is one concern; enforcement is a whole other issue.

Opportunities for Improvement

Do Increased Fines and Penalties Equal Environmental Improvement?

Are fines and penalties a good indicator of environmental performance? John Morelli, professor at the Rochester Institute of Technology, poses the question: would a police force be considered doing a good job if every year there were more arrests?⁴ Even EPA admitted that measuring inspections, fines, and violations "do not help us measure the state of compliance with environmental laws, the environmental results achieved, nor the degree to which program objectives are being met and non-compliance problems are being addressed."⁵

[33 ELR 10918]

Perhaps we can learn something from the turnaround in New York City. The city once had a very bad reputation. Crime was probably the leading reason why people were apprehensive about visiting the city. A change occurred shortly after Rudy Giuliani became mayor. One of his main concerns was to make the city a better, safer place. After eight years in office, there was 62% less crime, murders decreased by 66%, robberies decreased 67%, and there were 81,695 less auto thefts—a dramatic decrease!⁶ Why did this decrease in crime occur? For starters, there was a focus on prevention and better use of resources. In 1994, Mayor Giuliani made it clear that a police officer's "primary role was preventing crime."⁷ The crime-tracking computer system "CompStat" was introduced so resources could be focused on the "hot spots"—locations where crimes were more likely to occur.⁸ New emphases were put on prevention and measuring indicators that predicted problems. Leaders in the environmental field can learn an important lesson from this idea of proactive prevention and focusing resources on problems.

The current environmental enforcement system has been criticized because it focuses on the number of penalties issued and criminal cases filed rather than on improvement. It seems that EPA is always setting records in collecting fines and penalties. For example, in its annual enforcement status reports for the last four years, they reported: $ 26 million in administrative penalties in fiscal year (FY) 2002, "an increase of $ 2 million from the FY 2001 amount"⁹; "record-setting expenditures" of $ 4.3 billion by violators in 2001¹⁰; a "record cumulative total" of 6,047 civil, criminal, and administrative penalties in 2000¹¹; and a "record $ 3.8 billion worth of injunctive relief to correct violations" in 1999.¹² Why are records still being set decades after regulations have been enacted? Is there a focus on prevention or on collections?

Regardless of the answer to these fundamental questions, it is still important to note that to EPA's and many state agencies' credit, they report more than ever before on the effectiveness of their compliance assistance initiatives and on the millions of pounds of pollutants that have been reduced as a result of their programs. That's the good news. The bad news is that "records" are still expected. Sooner or later, improving the environment needs to be the main metric, not fines and penalties. This Article does not advocate an end to fines and penalties as a metric; rather, it urges that they be administered carefully. Violation counting propagates adversarial relationships that have been all too common in environmental enforcement programs for years.

Regulatory Agencies' Approach to Compliance

Regulatory agencies can use a variety of methods to get companies to comply. The approach of the regulatory agency is important in determining how to enforce environmental regulation. Robert Kagen of the University of California, Berkeley, uses terms that help us understand how the agency can shape the enforcement style. One term is "amoral calculator," where the industry is thought to be consciously devising ways to get around the regulation. The opposing view is termed "corporate citizen," where the industry is willing to work with the regulator to achieve common goals.¹³ When you believe most of the firms being regulated are trying to get away with polluting, you want to use the enforcement stick. If you view companies as corporate citizens, you partner and coax compliance.

Inspection Rates

In addition to agencies looking at regulated entities differently, the resources available for performing inspections should be evaluated as well. Consider the fact that no enforcement program can detect all the violations all the time because inspection resources are always limited. According to an EPA report, there are approximately 850,000 regulated facilities nationwide, of which 112,226 are considered large sources.¹⁴ In a two-year period from 1996-1998, EPA reported that 38,136 (34%) of the large facilities received a single media inspection.¹⁵ Of all these inspections, only 859 facilities—less than 1%—received an inspection in all three media (air, water, and hazardous waste).¹⁶ This leaves 74,090 large facilities that were not visited. Enforcement actions resulting from the inspections occurred at 2,632 (7%) of the sites, indicating that a majority of the sites inspected were not causing serious problems.¹⁷ EPA states that the noncompliance data may be understated.¹⁸ Nevertheless, these figures suggest that inspections are being performed at a low rate and may not be targeting poor performers. Also keep in mind that this data doesn't even reflect potential problems at less informed smaller facilities (about 738,000 sites).

[33 ELR 10919]

[SEE Figure 1 Inspection Rates at Large Facilities Over a 2-Year Period IN ORIGINAL]

Source: EPA Region I StarTrack Report (Hale 1998)

Less Resources Available for Environmental Protection

Another emerging trend that should cause us to rethink our current course is that state environmental agencies and EPA have had their budgets cut. The 2003 proposed EPA budget is $ 283 million below the previous year's funding level.¹⁹ Can we expect anything other than incremental increases in the funds available to state and federal environmental agencies, if any? New discoveries of horrific problems that spurred past government spending on initiatives like the CAA, CERCLA, and RCRA are not likely. It's virtually impossible to continue to improve the environment with decreased spending. So how do we achieve a healthier environment with little or no additional resources? While there is no easy answer, the solution probably lies in approaching some issues differently.

Coaxing Compliance

Environmental regulations are meaningless if they are not being followed, as compliance is critical to "realizing the benefits envisioned by environmental policy."²⁰ Compliance means that the regulated entity is "achieving the required environmental standards, regulations or permit conditions by meeting expected behaviors in processes and practices."²¹ Enforcement comprises the "legal tool[s] … designed to compel compliance," including the sanctions or penalties that result from noncompliance.²²

Consistent enforcement not only ensures the "credibility" of the regulations but also prevents companies that do not comply from gaining an economic advantage over those that do comply.²³

[SEE Figure 2 Compliance With Regulations (Tietenberg 1992) IN ORIGINAL]

Prof. Tom Tietenberg of Colby College provides a useful perspective on enforcement policy: "There will always be 5% of individuals that will violate no matter what, 20% that will comply no matter what, and 75% that will comply only if the violators are punished and/or the requirements are perceived as non-arbitrary."²⁴ Therefore, an effective enforcement policy should be mindful that although there is a significant group of companies that intend to follow the rules, there is a much larger majority that needs clear incentives if they are going to comply.

Some regulatory agencies, such as the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, are rethinking their traditional approaches to enforcement and looking at ways to focus their resources for maximum benefit. Wisconsin came to believe that the current system targets companies that, "for the most part, obey environmental laws," and began to wonder if this were the wisest method for using public funds.²⁵ These agencies began to question this "suspicion-driven system" in which "distrust … wasted attention on those who don't need it and diverted attention from unregulated and unsolved environmental problems."²⁶ In response they developed a system that gives flexibility and less oversight to companies that have good environmental performance records.²⁷

More and more regulatory agencies are coming up with voluntary programs, compliance assistance, and reward and recognition initiatives. One example is EPA's Performance Track. The program is designed to reward participants that willingly reduce pollutants beyond regulatory requirements.²⁸ These programs are forging a partnership between the regulatory entity and the agency—rewards for going the extra mile.

[33 ELR 10920]

Cooperative efforts are strongly advocated by the Aspen Institute, an international nonprofit educational institution. A proposal called the Alternative Path suggests that companies and communities be allowed to design their own approaches that will create opportunities for environmental improvement. The Aspen Institute's work laid the foundation for EPA's innovative Project XL, which permits companies to propose programs that go beyond compliance in return for flexibility in complying with regulations.²⁹ There are many benefits to relying on some form of limited self-regulation besides lower cost and flexibility. For example, we can take advantage of industries' voluntary pollution reduction programs to attain greater environmental gains.

Figure 3

Self-Regulation Versus Traditional Regulation

Aspect(NEW COLUMN)Self-Regulation(NEW COLUMN)Traditional Regulation

Rulemaking(NEW COLUMN)Easier to develop,(NEW COLUMN)Complex Development

(NEW COLUMN)More Flexible and(NEW COLUMN)Process, Lengthy

(NEW COLUMN)Faster to Implement,(NEW COLUMN)Implementation Time,

(NEW COLUMN)Inexpensive(NEW COLUMN)High Cost

Agency(NEW COLUMN)Lower Administrative(NEW COLUMN)High Administrative

Oversight(NEW COLUMN)Resources, More(NEW COLUMN)Costs, More

(NEW COLUMN)Cooperative(NEW COLUMN)Adversarial

Ease of(NEW COLUMN)Easier to Conform,(NEW COLUMN)More Complex,

Conformance(NEW COLUMN)More Flexible, Less(NEW COLUMN)Difficult to Conform

to Standards(NEW COLUMN)Paperwork(NEW COLUMN)to Standards

Public Trust(NEW COLUMN)Lower Degree of(NEW COLUMN)High Degree of

(NEW COLUMN)Public Trust, Depends(NEW COLUMN)Public Confidence

(NEW COLUMN)on the Amount of

(NEW COLUMN)Government

(NEW COLUMN)Involvement

Stakeholder(NEW COLUMN)Typically Low(NEW COLUMN)More Open Process,

Involvement(NEW COLUMN)Stakeholder(NEW COLUMN)High Degree of Public

(NEW COLUMN)Involvement,(NEW COLUMN)Involvement

(NEW COLUMN)Noninclusive

(NEW COLUMN)Process

Sanctions for(NEW COLUMN)Low or Minimal(NEW COLUMN)High Sanctions

Nonconformance(NEW COLUMN)Sanctions

The importance of tapping into industry's efforts to protect the environment is highlighted in a report from the National Research Council that depicts the current regulatory approach as an incomplete environmental strategy due to its command-and-control methodology. The report concludes that industry-initiated environmental improvement programs should be an important supplement to regulatory activity.³⁰

Successful Voluntary Initiatives

Some companies go beyond regulatory requirements by voluntarily improving their environmental impact to be viewed as good corporate citizens. According to Dirk Schmelzer, Professor of Economics at Europa-Universitat, Germany, companies want to be recognized as "socially responsible by customers, employees],] and neighbors."³¹

Many companies publicly commit to reducing their environmental footprint—just take a look at their annual sustainability reports. For example, Dupont has made public their goals for reducing energy, using renewable resources, and reducing waste and toxic release inventory chemicals. Electrolux is trying to green its products by introducing green stoves, refrigerators, and washing machines that reduce energy and water use. Similarly, the Ford Motor Company is designing vehicles that can more easily be disassembled and recycled, reducing toxic substance use, carbon dioxide emissions, and water use, and is requiring suppliers to embrace the voluntary environmental management system International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001.³² Johnson & Johnson has agreed to decrease the amount of raw materials used to make its products, reduce energy and water use, and minimize hazardous and nonhazardous waste.³³

One would be hard pressed to find a medium to large company that did not have an environmental auditing program. Why? Because a lot of companies are seriously trying to comply with regulations and an increasing amount of companies are going beyond that which is required by law. Many companies have voluntarily reduced pollution through participation in programs like the 33/50 program, EPA's voluntary toxic chemical emission reduction program. According to EPA, the program's goals were achieved in 1994, one year ahead of schedule.³⁴ Since the program was voluntary, the Agency did not use a lot of resources. There were no regulatory notices, rule proposals, or court fights. About 7,500 letters were sent to company chief executive officers asking for a commitment to reduce toxic chemical emissions. Approximately 1,300 companies agreed to sign on to the program. The results are impressive: 824 million pounds of toxic chemical releases were removed from the environment. Even better is the fact that progress tracked one-year past the program goal to 1996 shows there was a 60% reduction achieved.³⁵ Notably, all it took to reach such impressive results was sending out letters and asking for commitments.

[33 ELR 10921]

[SEE Figure 4 EPA 33/50 Program (millions lbs) IN ORIGINAL]

Two very successful industry-government partnership programs are EPA's Green Lights and Energy Star programs. In these voluntary programs, participants agree to purchase and design energy-efficient equipment and lighting. Participants sign agreements to implement energy-efficient practices and periodic progress reports are sent to the Agency. EPA rewards participants with recognition, awards ceremonies, and public service announcements. The results have been very convincing. Thousands of companies, nonprofit groups, academic institutions, and state and local governments have entered into the Energy Star and Green Lights programs.³⁶ In 2001, greenhouse gas emissions were reduced by 38 million metric tons of carbon equivalent, nitrogen oxides were reduced by 140,000 tons, and 80 billion kilowatt hours were saved. The organizations that participated also benefitted by saving more than $ 6 billion in their 2001 electric bills.³⁷

Many businesses are willing to go beyond the regulations and have reduced thousands of tons of pollutants. Shouldn't these types of efforts be encouraged? An agency's approach toward those it regulates plays a large role in whether a company is persuaded into entering these self-initiated programs.

Getting More Companies to Go Beyond Compliance

We have established that it is difficult to understand and comply with every regulation on the books. There are fewer resources to enforce the regulations, and many sites are not being inspected. We have also established that self-regulation, in addition to traditional regulatory methods, can be quite effective. Regulatory agencies, therefore, should consider influencing voluntary compliance efforts of companies and allowing limited self-regulation, thereby enabling scarce resources to be focused on the companies that really need it (see Figure 2). Self-regulation doesn't mean the participating sites never get inspected, but rather they get inspected less than those that have not agreed to police themselves and voluntarily reduce emissions.

If real benefits were offered to firms that willingly reduce emissions, we will start seeing more environmental improvement. Current voluntary emission reduction programs do not offer enough benefits to attract many businesses. They primarily attract proactive companies that already have publicly stated a willingness to go the extra mile. The main benefit offered so far has been acknowledgment as an environmental leader. This is coveted for companies with name recognition, but for a firm that supplies a product or service that does not have name brand recognition, it has little value. The benefits that will attract the middle and some low performers will be less frequent agency inspections and more flexibility on their site. Companies who participate in proactive programs should be treated with more trust and less skepticism. They voluntarily reduce emissions, police themselves, and correct violations in a timely manner. Agencies should respond by trying to speed up their permit applications, give them more flexibility to make changes on their site, and only use the enforcement stick if they significantly breach their regulatory commitments. This strategy will be more effective in coaxing firms to voluntarily reduce emissions. This proactive approach would be analogous to the way the New York City Police Department responded to crime.

[SEE Figure 5 IN ORIGINAL]

Concerns With Self-Regulation

Since the Security and Exchange Act of 1934, companies have been permitted to self-regulate the reporting of their own financial data. Until recently, there has mostly been an atmosphere of cooperation and compliance. Still, skeptics can't be blamed for concluding that limited regulatory supervision was responsible for the Enron fiasco and others who were quietly scheming and committing criminal offenses under the radar. Do we scrap a system that has mostly worked for a very long time? Enforcement, we have learned, eventually does occur. In Enron and other similar cases, the measure has been prison terms for senior executives, shareholders left holding the bag, and companies in ruins. The past year has taught us that the U.S. Security Exchange Commission (SEC) system most definitely needs some finetuning. We can apply some of these lessons to environmental self-regulation.

Consider the many areas where we ask companies to honestly report information: wastewater discharge reports; unpermitted releases of chemicals; and air emission reports, to name a few. Just about every regulatory program is based [33 ELR 10922] on companies evaluating their own operations and reporting on them. Allowing companies that are willing to go beyond regulatory requirements into a limited self-regulatory program while we keep inspecting them (albeit less frequently) will lead to much more oversight than the SEC system. But the line needs to be monitored carefully. If a company steps across the line, it needs to feel severe consequences.

Limited self-regulation can be looked at with fear and mistrust, or it can be used in a manner that will take the best of traditional regulation and self-regulation. An effective system not only has the proper enforcement checks, but also takes advantage of and encourages voluntary compliance while focusing agency resources on the poor performers.

Conclusion

In this new regulatory setting, we must decide whether to continue down the same road or work to achieve better results by applying new strategies. Since an increase in funding environmental programs is not likely for state and federal agencies, pollution reduction and compliance pose considerable challenges. Despite this climate, many large-and medium-size companies have already voluntarily reduced millions of pounds of pollutants, set their own pollutant reduction targets, and signed on to various voluntary initiatives, such as the 33/50 program, Green Lights, and Energy Star.

Commendable as this may be, these companies continue to wrestle in a regulatory setting that is muddled and difficult to interpret. EPA and state agencies need to consider taking a page out of New York City's crime prevention success story by not only focusing on prevention, but on inspiring marginal performing companies to police themselves. Treating organizations that are willing to voluntarily conform as a respected environmental partner and first-rate corporate citizen is one sure-fire way to coax regulatory compliance. Another is to dangle even bigger carrots before their eyes, i.e., tangible benefits such as less frequent inspections, more freedom to correct self-identified violations without repercussions, and improved expediency in the permit approval process. In the end, we all play a part in protecting the environment. Why not foster a spirit of cooperation to get better results?³⁸

1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, ELR STAT. CAA §§ 101-618; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, ELR STAT. FWPCA §§ 101-607; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, ELR STAT. CERCLA §§ 101-405; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k, ELR STAT. RCRA §§ 1001-11011.

2. CLARENCE J. DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE U.S. SYSTEM WORK? 2 (Resources for the Future 1997), available at http://www.rff.org/books/descriptions/regpollute.htm (last visited July 9, 2003).

3. ALEXANDER VOLOKH & ROGER MARZULLA, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: IN SEARCH OF BOTH EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS 1 (Reason Found. 1996).

4. JOHN MORELLI, VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 125 (Lewis Publishers 1999).

5. U.S. EPA, PROTECTING YOUR HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PAST FIVE YEARS 21 (1999) (available from the ELR Guidance & Policy Collection, ELR Order No. AD04066).

6. John Marzulli, NYC Crime Plunged in '01, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2001, at 7.

7. Id.

8. Id.

9. U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS THROUGH SMART ENFORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2002 ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT 14 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance.

10. U.S. EPA, EPA Achieves Significant Compliance and Enforcement Progress in 2001, ENVTL. NEWS, Jan. 31, 2002, at 1-2.

11. Press Release, Communications, Education, and Media Relations, U.S. EPA, EPA Releases FY 2000 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Data (Jan. 19, 2001) (on file with the author).

12. Press Release, U.S. EPA, EPA Sets Enforcement Records in 1999 (Jan. 19, 2000).

13. Robert A. Kagan, On Regulatory Inspectorates and Police, in ENFORCING REGULATION 74-77 (Keith Hawkins & John Thomas eds., Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing 1983).

14. RHEA HALE, THE NATIONAL EXPANSION OF STARTRACK 10-12 (U.S. EPA Region 1 1998).

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Steve Cook, EPA Budge Request Includes Staff Cut at Enforcement Office, Grants to States, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 286 (Feb. 8, 2002).

20. TOM TIETENBERG, INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1992).

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. Id.

24. Id. at 25.

25. GEORGE E. MEYER, A GREEN TIER FOR GREATER ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 5 (Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources 1999).

26. Id.

27. Id.

28. For more details, see U.S. EPA, National Environmental Performance Track Standard Criteria, at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/program/standard.htm (last visited July 9, 2003).

29. JOHN A. RIGGS, THE ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE ENVIRONMENT § 1 (Aspen Inst. 1996), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/Programt1.asp?bid=928 (last visited July 25, 2003).

30. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOSTERING INDUSTRY-INITIATED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS ix (1997).

31. Dirk Schmelzer, Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Policy: Negotiating Emission Reductions, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 56 (Carlo Carraro & Francois Leveque, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999).

32. ISO promotes the development and implementation of voluntary international standards, both for particular products and for environmental management issues. The ISO 14001 standard requires that a community or organization put in place and implement a series of practices and procedures that, when taken together, result in an environmental management system. ISO 14001 is not a technical standard and does not replace technical requirements embodied in statutes or regulations. It also does not set prescribed standards of performance for organizations. For more information, see U.S. EPA, Environmental Management Systems/ISO 14001—Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.epa.gov/OW-OWM.html/iso14001/isofaq.htm (last visited July 9, 2003).

33. AL IANNUZZI, INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE 130-39 (Lewis Publishers 2002).

34. U.S. EPA, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1-4 (1999).

35. Id.

36. Kathleen Hogan, Commentary, 38 ENV'T 3 (1996).

37. AIR & RADIATION, U.S. EPA, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 5-6 (2002).

38. To learn more about self-regulation, please refer to AL IANNUZZI, INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE (Lewis Publishers 2002).