33 ELR 10265 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 2003 | All rights reserved

The Future of the Animal Rights Movement: Environmental Conflict, Artificial Intelligence, and Beyond

Jon Owens is a Staff Attorney at U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Administrative Law Judges. He received an LL.M in Energy and Environmental Law from Tulane Law School in 2000; a J.D. from John Marshall Law School in 1998; and a B.A. from Oglethorpe University in 1995. This Article was written in the author's nonofficial capacity, and no official support or endorsement of the U.S. government of this Article is intended or should be inferred.

Mr. Owens would like to thank the following for reviewing and/or submitting comments on an earlier draft of this Article: Layman Allen, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Kevin Ashley, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law and Professor of Intelligent Systems, Graduate Program in Intelligent Systems—University of Pittsburgh; Hugo de Garis, Professor and Head of Utah State University's Artificial Brain Project; Donald Nute, Director, Artificial Intelligence Center, University of Georgia; Peter Singer, DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University and author of Animal Liberation; Bruce Wagman, Adjunct Professor, University of California—Hastings College of Law and co-author of the Animal Law casebook; Steven Wise, animal law attorney and author of Rattling the Cage and Drawing the Line; and Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence. All mistakes are those of the author, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the aforementioned people.

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I. Introduction

The fate of humans has been intertwined with the fate of other animals since human ancestors scavenged the carcasses of non-human animals, nearly six million years ago. Feeding upon the meat of other animals gave these early humans a boost of protein, providing their brains with extra energy for higher level thinking. Thus began the rise of humanity and the flourishing of Homo sapiens.

The modern animal rights movement has made some gains in convincing humans that non-human animals are more than mere tools. They have convinced some humans that other animals' interests deserve at least some consideration. They have proven the strong intellectual, emotional, and linguistic similarities between humans and other higher level life-forms such as apes and whales. But the modest successes of the animal rights movement may soon be undone by recent advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering. The new technology will provide inventors with the opportunity to create nonsentient animals, lacking the ability to feel pain. Such inventions will mute the concerns of animal rights activists, to say the least.

But on the verge of awakening is the newest high-level life-forms, created from artificial intelligence (A.I.). Animal rights activists should take part in a crusade to define who controls and defines what these new animals will be. As A.I. could be the most powerful force able to affect the planet, environmentalists should argue for their concerns to be integrated into the values of this new species.

II. A Short History of Humanity: The Rise and Fall of (Some) Human Species

Homo sapiens, apes, monkeys, and Neanderthals, among others share a common ancestor.¹ One of the more significant events in human evolution is when Homo sapiens and its direct ancestor Australopithecus africanus, began to eat meat. By eating meat, this supplied extra energy to stimulate the activity and growth of their brains, along with complex thought.² Consequently, the omnivorous Australopithecus africanus had a competitive advantage over its smaller brained vegetarian cousin species, who succumbed to the competition and went extinct approximately 1.2 million years ago.³

Hundreds of thousands of years later, modern humans (sometimes referred to as Cro-Magnons)⁴ and Neanderthals emerge as separate species.⁵ Neanderthals were similar to modern humans in that they regularly used fire, buried their dead, and cared for their elderly.⁶ They also used tools, albeit crude stone tools.⁷ They possessed some advantages over humans, being physically stronger and having brains more than 10% larger than modern humans.⁸ This marks the last time modern humans "share" the planet with another human species, but their cohabitation does not last long. Neanderthals survived in Europe 70,000 years until modern humans arrived on the scene and the Neanderthals promptly ceased to exist.⁹

Despite the Neanderthals' advantages, modern humans invaded Europe approximately 40,000 years ago and swiftly replaced the native Neanderthals.¹⁰ Anthropologists theorize that modern humans may have had advantages in the way their brains were organized or possessed superior communication abilities due to the evolution of their larynx.¹¹ [33 ELR 10266] By the time of their encounter with the Neanderthals, modern humans had developed the ability to innovate and had devised sophisticated tools and weaponry, including spears, axes, fishhooks, needles, harpoons, and bows and arrows.¹² Pulitzer-prize winning physiologist and anthropologist Jared Diamond theorizes that modern humans defeated Neanderthals, in the same way that peoples such as Native Americans were defeated: by disease and superior weaponry.¹³

Without competition from Neanderthals and other humanoid species, modern humans continued to expand into new parts of the world.¹⁴ They became master of the surprise attack on animals.¹⁵ Upon first moving into foreign lands, humans would swiftly wipe out the megafauna before it had time to adapt to and fear the invading humans.¹⁶ This resulted in unintended and ultimately tragic consequences for Native Americans. By annihilating species that might have been domesticated, such as native horses and camels, they unintentionally deprived themselves of animals that would have been useful as tools for furthering the development of a technologically advanced civilization.¹⁷ In Meso-America and other places, the scarcity of megafauna as a source of valuable protein drove their civilizations into functional vegetarianism and cannibalism.¹⁸ The Native Americas' lack of easily domesticated animals placed them at a cultural and physiological disadvantage to Europeans.¹⁹ In contrast, the conquering Europeans developed large populations with advanced technology supported by many different species of domesticated plants and animals.²⁰ By living in close proximity with these animals, many of whom carried disease, they built up strong resistance to germs.²¹ Consequently, when modern Europeans invaded America they brought their germs with them, and this led to devastation as several million Native Americans died from disease.²²

Using animals as tools also had unintentional influences on human culture, including religion. For instance, the suitability or inefficiency of raising some species of animals in certain environments influenced the development of distinctive religious practices.²³ As examples, several Middle Eastern religions developed taboos against eating pork, as pigs do not thrive well in arid environments, while the Hindu religion in India developed reverence for native humpbacked cows, which are traditionally essential for crop production and long-term sustainability in India.²⁴

III. History and Pre-History of Animal Rights

A. Animal Rights Theorists and Organizations

Throughout the history of humans, the human species has, for the most part, regarded non-human animals as having no interests and existing for the sole purpose of serving humankind.²⁵ Although the view of non-human animals as tools has dominated culture, a notable exception is Jerry Bentham, a founder of the utilitarian movement.²⁶ Bentham postulated that all animals have an interest in pleasure and the avoidance of suffering.²⁷ Because of the emotional similarities between animals and humans, he argued that humans should respect those interests.²⁸

In 1975, nearly 200 years later, philosopher Peter Singer revived Bentham's concerns in his influential book, Animal Liberation, now heralded as "the bible of the animal liberation movement."²⁹ Singer declared most humans to be "speciesists," similar to racists, as they both draw arbitrary boundaries against consideration of the interests of others, with speciesists using species as a barrier.³⁰ Under Singer's utilitarianism, humans are instructed to consider the interests of other animals and thus avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering on them due to practices such as meat-eating, the wearing of fur, and certain medical experiments.³¹

Although Singer rails against the species boundary, both he and other high-profile animal rights theorists and organizations believe there is some distinction to be made between humans, other life-forms, and the environment. Though Singer calls for the "equal consideration of the interests of all animals,"³² when it comes to plant life, he reasons that because plants do not feel pain or pleasure, their interests do not count.³³ Even assuming plants do feel some modicum of pain, he reasons that it is preferable for humans to eat plants instead of animal life, the latter of which are more "sentient."³⁴ He even uses a specialized definition of "sentience," which he defines as the capacity to suffer or feel enjoyment,³⁵ whereas it more commonly takes the broader meanings of the capacity for feeling or perceiving, or self-awareness.³⁶ In Animal Liberation, Singer proclaims "the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful [33 ELR 10267] way."³⁷ As will be explained later, the foregoing proclamation from the "bible" of the animal rights movement may be the seed for the movement's downfall, but may also brings about its renaissance.

Animal rights theorists and activists traditionally have focused their efforts on protection of those animals most similar to humans, above all primates and cetaceans. In 1975, a student law journal article pointed to the mental, emotional, and linguistic similarities of dolphins, chimpanzees, gorillas, and humans.³⁸ Because of these similarities, the commentator argued in favor of recognizing rights for such intelligent species.³⁹ That article drew the attention of the likes of Carl Sagan and its legislative proposal formed the basis for New Zealand's efforts to legislate protection for apes.⁴⁰ Others have sought protection specifically for whales, observing their high level of linguistic abilities, including their ability for interspecies communication.⁴¹ They also observe that whales' cerebral cortexes, which serve memory and conceptual thought, are larger than that of humans.⁴² Notable are the suicides of whales, in which one whale is stranded ashore and other whales suicidally rush to follow.⁴³

Also fighting for the rights of the more "human" non-human animals, is the Great Ape Project, which is an organization co-founded by Singer in 1993.⁴⁴ The project seeks rights for apes based on their similarities to humans in mental, linguistic, and emotional characteristics.⁴⁵ In doing so, the Great Ape Project's "Declaration on Great Apes" seeks to expand the "community of equals" and seeks the following rights or protections for apes: (1) right to life; (2) protection of individual liberty; and (3) prohibition of torture.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, in the 2002 edition of Animal Liberation, Singer reaffirms his commitment to the interests of all animals.⁴⁷ He explains the Great Ape Project as the "ideal case for showing the arbitrariness of the species boundary."⁴⁸ He also prophesies that recognition of rights for apes will bridge the gap between humans and other species and make it more feasible to extend equal consideration for other species.⁴⁹

Steven Wise, an animal rights attorney and theorist, advocates that judges should recognize the basic liberty rights of animals who possess high-level cognitive abilities. First, in his book, Rattling the Cage, Wise makes a plea to judges to treat certain apes, particularly chimpanzees and bonobos, as "persons" under the eyes of the law instead of property, and he bases his argument on the great similarities of such animals to humans.⁵⁰ In his more recent book, Drawing the Line, Wise further elaborates on the basis for recognizing the basic rights of non-human animals based on what he terms "practical autonomy," to distinguish it from the completely rational state of "full autonomy" that even few humans attain.⁵¹ Unlike utilitarians, he bases practical autonomy on cognitive qualities rather than the mere ability to feel pain or pleasure.⁵² He submits that philosophers and common-law judges alike would agree that "personhood" is attained when a being can: (1) desire; (2) intentionally try to fulfill its own desires; and (3) possess a sense of self-sufficiency which includes self-awareness.⁵³ Further, he would seek legal protection for beings who clearly possess these qualities, including human children, orangutans, and dolphins.⁵⁴ Where the case for practical autonomy is not so clear but where a being demonstrates some sophisticated mental abilities, such as the problem-solving abilities or the incredibly strong memories of elephants, he would support at least some level of protection.⁵⁵ At a minimum, he demands that the law protect the basic liberty rights of such creatures, including the right of bodily integrity against slavery and torture.⁵⁶

Although Singer has traditionally expressed respect for all creatures who can feel pain or pleasure, his recent remarks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States betray his personal hierarchy of animal welfare interests in which the lives of some animals carry very little weight.⁵⁷ In the Australian journal, Vegan Voice, Singer rejected claims that the interests of chickens are equal to the interests of humans.⁵⁸ Although he acknowledged that millions of chickens die every day, he reasoned that the September 11th terrorist victims' deaths were more tragic because of the victims' close family ties and greater level of self-awareness.⁵⁹

In rebuttal, Karen Davis of United Poultry Concerns argued that the loss of 3,000 or more people to terrorism was not a greater tragedy than the day-to-day loss of millions of chickens, who are also sentient and defenseless against the [33 ELR 10268] intentional killings.⁶⁰ She also observed that under the principles of utilitarianism, the deaths of thousands of human meat-eaters would result in a net gain in the pleasure of sentient beings in general by saving thousands of non-human, sentient animals who would have otherwise needlessly fallen victim to humans.⁶¹

Despite some exceptions, animal rights theorists, for the most part, follow a hierarchy in which they place the greatest value on those animals most similar to humans, such as apes, based on their "human" qualities, such as emotional capacities and cognitive abilities.⁶² In contrast, as an animal becomes more like an inanimate object, such as a rock, or an evolutionary distant "nuisance" species, such as an insect, its interests become minimal at best.⁶³

B. Laws Concerning Non-Human Animals

The laws that tend to protect non-human animals traditionally have been intended to further the interests of humans more than the non-human animals. For instance, conservation laws protecting animals such as seals and whales were originally enacted to protect human interests in preserving these species as long-term resources.⁶⁴

In the United States, most states did not begin to enact animal cruelty legislation until the middle to late 1800s.⁶⁵ Prior to that, scant protection was provided by trespass and malicious mischief statutes, which required damage to an animal's owner.⁶⁶ The common law failed to protect the interests of non-human animals against cruelty.⁶⁷

In the United States, animal cruelty legislation marked the beginning of legal protection of the interests of non-human animals against cruelty.⁶⁸ The enactment of animal cruelty statutes marked some progress for the condition of non-human animals, as such statutes do not require direct harm to a human.⁶⁹ Unfortunately for those animals, however, many courts have traditionally refused to find cruelty where the harm imposed on the animal, even excessive harm, is done with the purpose to protect valued human interests, such as beating a horse in order to force it to obey its human masters.⁷⁰

In fact, a primary goal of animal cruelty statutes has been to protect humans against developing the immoral quality of being cruel to other humans.⁷¹ Recent scientific studies now strongly support the link between children's cruelty to animals and their violence directed at other people later in life.⁷² In contrast, critics of animal protection laws claim that those laws actually reduce respect for human life and point to Nazi Germany as proof.⁷³ Nazi Germany, as with many other countries in the world, including France, Great Britain, and the United States, had laws protecting animals.⁷⁴ Of course animal cruelty laws by themselves, do not necessarily act as a guarantee against human cruelty.⁷⁵ As to Nazi Germany, Nazi politicians perverted their animal cruelty and endangered species laws by using them to promote an agenda of superiority and separateness of the races.⁷⁶ Nazi nature protection laws were consistent with the early Nazi race laws of the time, which focused on measures such as prohibitions on interracial marriage and citizenship laws, that would separate rather than exterminate other races.⁷⁷ Their endangered species laws were enacted at that same time, in the early to mid-1930s, before the Holocaust.⁷⁸ Nazis also politicized their animals protection laws in an effort to show that only pure-blooded German citizens had an understanding of and mastery over nature.⁷⁹

As to animal cruelty legislation in the United States, the federal Twenty-Eight Hour Law,⁸⁰ first enacted in 1873, stands out as a milestone in animal cruelty legislation. This statute mandates that people transporting non-human animals across state lines cannot confine such animals for more than 28 hours.⁸¹ It also mandates rest for those animals and adequate food and water.⁸² The statute was enacted primarily to protect the animals from harsh transport conditions, at times so extreme as to result in their deaths.⁸³ As a secondary [33 ELR 10269] goal, the statute protects the property interests of the animals' owners.⁸⁴ Another landmark, the Humane Slaughter Act⁸⁵ of 1960, mandates swift and painless killings of livestock. Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress refused to grant such protections to chickens and expressly exempted them from the Act.⁸⁶

However, the principal federal statute regulating animal use is the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).⁸⁷ As originally enacted in 1966, the AWA's enactment was motivated by the public's great concern for their pets stolen for use in laboratory experiments and concern for the welfare of animals used in research.⁸⁸ The AWA and its implementing regulations extend protection to "any live or dead dog, cat, nonhuman primate, guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or other warm-blooded animal, which is being used, or is intended for use for research, teaching, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet."⁸⁹ However, it excludes from protection, "birds, rats … mice … bred for use in research, and horses not used for research purposes and other farm animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry …."⁹⁰

The AWA further expanded on its hierarchy of animal interests when it finally recognized the special interests of non-human primates. In 1985, Congress amended the AWA in response to abuses of non-human primates perpetrated by researchers at the University of Pennsylvania.⁹¹ There, an animal rights group stole tapes revealing that head-injury researchers had conducted experiments on primates either without any anesthetics or with insufficient anesthetics.⁹² The tapes showed researchers laughing at the primates' pain and showed some of the animals waking up during brain surgery.⁹³ Among other changes, Congress instituted special requirements for a "physicial environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being" of non-human primates going above and beyond protections for other non-human animals.⁹⁴ Congress also endorsed the replacement of animals with computer simulations.⁹⁵

Finally, the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA)⁹⁶ also provides protection to non-human animals but is limited to protecting threatened or endangered species and their habitats.⁹⁷ Enactment of the ESA was motivated, at least in part, by humans' ethical and moral ideals toward protecting other life-forms.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, a primary goal of the ESA is to serve human interests, such as by preserving genetic diversity.⁹⁹ Preservation of genetic diversity carries great potential to serve humans as a defense against the unintended consequences of destruction. Such preservation can protect what may be the linchpin to a stable human environment or protect against destroying species that may possess the key to the next miracle drug or scientific breakthrough.¹⁰⁰ In light of this potential, it is prudent public policy to protect snail darters and other species with no currently known use against temporary jobs projects. The ESA also functions as a warning bell against too much destruction of the environment on which humans depend.¹⁰¹ It further prevents the loss of the beauty humans find in nature such as that of eagles, bears, wolves, and elephants.¹⁰² Finally, former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and others have found a "Noah's Ark" religious justification for preservation of endangered species.¹⁰³

As with the AWA, implementation of the ESA reveals humans' preference for higher level life-forms.¹⁰⁴ Generally, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which is a principal enforcer of the ESA, gives highest priority to mammals and then in descending priority, protects birds, cold-blooded vertebrates, cold-blooded invertebrates, and finally plants.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the ESA goes out of its way to specifically allow for the exemption of insect species determined to be "pest[s] whose protection … would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man."¹⁰⁶ So the AWA and ESA reveal a hierarchy in favor of higher level beings and thus correspond with animal rights activists' hierarchy in favor of higher level animals such as apes and other mammals.

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IV. Technology and Its Power to Diminish Consideration for Animals

Biotechnology is now on the verge of hitting animal rights interests with the double-whammy of cloning endangered species and the creation of new life-forms without "consciousness," the latter of which is the embodiment of self-awareness—the essence of higher level animal life.¹⁰⁷ Now that humans have developed the ability to clone animals, they are currently cloning some endangered species to take them away from the brink of extinction.¹⁰⁸ For instance, in India scientists have successfully cloned an endangered species of cow in that nation where cows are sacred.¹⁰⁹ Land developers desiring the habitats of endangered species can now argue that we can clone the species and later bring it back into existence, thus preserving its genetic value to the biotechnology industry and science in general. Cloning will thus remove one of the more powerful arguments in favor of preserving a diversity of life: its economic value to humans, thus weakening support for the preservation of endangered species.

Although some species do act as a linchpin or "keystone" to sustaining the overall health of the ecosystems on which humans depend, not many species fulfill this function.¹¹⁰ Remaining is the ethical concern for the welfare of all life-forms,¹¹¹ though developers could allay this concern by claiming that the removal of endangered species from the environment is merely a temporary solution and that will be reintroduced later, even though this would most likely be a hollow promise. Once humans have built houses and malls on the former habitat of an endangered species, it will be exceedingly difficult to convince the people to move.

Some species may justify their continued existence in their natural habitat due to their aesthetic appeal to humans, such as that of wolves and eagles.¹¹² However, many others lack this appeal or may be downright repulsive to ordinary human sensibilities, such as kangaroo rats and snail darters. Left standing is the function of endangered species as warning bells or "indicators" of the health of ecosystems on which humans depend, although even some supporters of endangered species admit that not all species play this role.¹¹³ Thus, the option of cloning endangered species is likely to provide developers with powerful arguments against the conservation or protection of endangered species.

Besides cloning endangered species, biotechnology also carries the ability to create genetically modified organisms (GMOs). With such technology one can foresee the near future, when scientists will be able to create a cow without the ability to feel pain. For instance, veal cattle must endure the misery of lifelong confinement to a tiny stall to prevent them from building muscles, which would lessen the tenderness of their flesh.¹¹⁴ Creating veal cattle that are incapable of being aware of their misery would provide beef producers with a powerful argument against claims of "inhumane" treatment. Such a change would mean the defeat, or at least the diminution of Singer's moral imperative to feel for animals. As Singer said: "The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way."¹¹⁵ In the long-run, erasing animals' ability to feel pain would distance them from humans and weaken empathy for such creatures, thus weakening concern for them. Although these animals would not be able to feel pain, they could still be harmed. For example, without pressure from the animal rights movement, farmers might choose to abandon the practice of raising free-range chickens, which is costlier but healthier for the chickens.¹¹⁶ These animals would be deprived of their sentience, which is treasured by humans as a special quality.¹¹⁷

Moreover, scientists might be able to directly produce the meat or flesh of a cow or other animal, bypassing the use of sentient animals for food.¹¹⁸ Applying the animal rights movement's own hierarchy, the new meat, which will be completely lacking in sentience and lifeless, will stand in the same status as a rock, which earns no protection under that movement's philosophy.¹¹⁹ Further, in the 2002 edition of Animal Liberation, Singer now professes that it may be better for some animals to never exist if the alternative is a life of pain and suffering.¹²⁰ Besides relieving the so-called [33 ELR 10271] burden of existence on animals, taking animals out of food production promises a great benefit to the environment by eliminating the environmental devastation caused by livestock and by avoiding the great loss of energy as it passes through the food chain.¹²¹

As for the future of biotechnology, there is likely to be an acceleration into research of GMOs, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently reinforced patent law protection of this practice. Patent law, by providing a limited monopoly over a technology, provides an economic incentive for the biotechnology industry to create new life-forms and quasi-lifeforms. The Court, in the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarky,¹²² construed the patent law to allow an inventor to patent "anything under the sun."¹²³ Ironically, in Diamond, the inventor sought a patent for a potentially environmentally beneficial technology—one which promised the creation of oil-eating bacteria to be used in the removal of oil spills.¹²⁴ Although the Court considered the risk to humans and the environment, it concluded that the patent law did not preclude patents on technology that creates new life-forms.¹²⁵ After Diamond, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted the first animal patent to Harvard University cancer researchers, for the technology to create a mouse specially susceptible to cancer.¹²⁶ Finally, in 2001, the Court upheld a patent on technology to create genetically modified plants.¹²⁷ This time, the Justices declined to even comment as to the environmental or moral implications of their decision.¹²⁸

Although in the long run biotechnology promises a great reduction in harm to the environment, as with many new technologies there are risks and there are bound to be some disasters.¹²⁹ The unforeseen and unintentional environmental disasters to come are legion. Newly fashioned creatures threaten to eliminate native species.¹³⁰ For instance, scientists have genetically modified some medaka fish by injecting them with the growth hormone from salmon.¹³¹ When pitted against native species of medaka, studies show the newer, larger species to attract mates more easily even though the native species may actually be a better long-term fit for the environment.¹³² This increases the risk of extinction for the native species.¹³³ Elsewhere, scientists' use of genetic technology to create larger salmon threatens to make them more susceptible to non-human predators.¹³⁴

Other unintended consequences of genetic manipulation include weakening human resistance to disease and insect "pests." For instance, scientists note that the creation of malaria-resistant mosquitoes would benefit humans in the short run but disaster would ensue should the mosquitoes' protection unexpectedly fail at a time when humans' resistance to malaria has fallen.¹³⁵

Furthermore, the media widely covered initial studies of the threat of genetically modified corn which appeared to pose a serious threat to monarch butterflies.¹³⁶ That corn, known as Bt corn, contains a bacterium gene designed to kill a moth larva "pest" called the corn borer.¹³⁷ The toxic corn pollen may migrate to milkweed on which the butterflies feed, where the toxins can kill the strikingly beautiful butterflies.¹³⁸ Although later government studies estimate the impact on this species to be negligible,¹³⁹ what may be more disturbing is an impending genetic arms race with insects. Some corn borers become resistant to the corn's toxins and are able to pass its resistant trait onto the next generation of corn borers if mating with other resistant borers.¹⁴⁰ To counteract this evolutionary mechanism, the federal government mandates that farmers plant at least 20% of their fields with ordinary corn.¹⁴¹ Despite this mandate, one-third of farmers who use Bt corn have been ignoring this requirement.¹⁴² Furthermore, other pitfalls remain, including harming the enemies of crop pests, resistance of the bioengineered toxins to biodegradability, and the escape of the crop's insect-resistant genes into unwanted plants.¹⁴³

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Another example of unexpected and dangerous consequences comes from Australia, where scientists engineered a mousepox virus designed to "control" rodents.¹⁴⁴ They intended the virus to increase the immune response of the rodents, which they hoped would make female mice reject their own eggs.¹⁴⁵ Unfortunately, their experiments created a supervirus that could have caused great environmental damage if released into the environment.¹⁴⁶ As inventors have been known to file well more than 10,000 biotechnology patent applications per year,¹⁴⁷ there are bound to be future well-publicized failures of biotechnology to attract the public's attention.¹⁴⁸

Furthermore, there are great moral implications in the creation of higher level life-forms. This is exemplified by the 1997 patent application of scientist Stuart Newman and animal rights activist Jeremy Rifkin, who jointly filed an application for the technology to create the hybrid of a non-human animal and a human being.¹⁴⁹ The technology would allow for the insertion and fusion of human brain cells into the brain of an ape or other non-human animal.¹⁵⁰ Their goal was to force the PTO to take a clear stand against the patenting of technology to create higher level life-forms.¹⁵¹ If granted the patent, they planned to use their patent infringement rights to prevent others from exploiting the technology while they appealed to a higher court.¹⁵² Ultimately, the PTO rejected the patent application.¹⁵³ In doing so, it concluded that the patent "embraced a human being" and was therefore not patentable subject matter, apparently due to the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on slavery and ownership of people.¹⁵⁴

V. Artificial Intelligence: The Next Frontier of Environmentalists and Animal Rights Activists

A. The Future Power of A.I.

Likely, the unintended environmental catastrophes with transgenic technology and the furor over the creation of higher level life-forms will create some additional leverage for the environmental and animal rights movements. But at the same time, the creation of painless animals and the invention of the animal-less meat will threaten to erase the qualities that move people to care about other animals: their similarities to humans. On the rise, however, is a new species of animal that should be the principal concern of both animal rights and environmental activists: artificially intelligent beings.

A.I. is a field of study focused on the creation of artificial, inorganic "minds" capable of abstract thought at or above human ability.¹⁵⁵ Ray Kurzweil, who is among the world's most renowned inventors and A.I. theorists,¹⁵⁶ defines "intelligence" as the ability to use optimally limited resources to achieve a set of goals, such as the ability to employ problem-solving skills.¹⁵⁷ As will be seen, artificially intelligent beings (A.I. beings) will be the newest "animal" that deserves the most attention by animal rights groups and environmentalists.

The two principal approaches to achieving human-level A.I. are the top-down and bottom-up approaches.¹⁵⁸ The "strong A.I." approach is a top-down method, in which humans program intelligence into a computer program.¹⁵⁹ Due at least in part to the great cost of imparting all human intelligence into computers, the strong A.I. approach has fallen out of favor.¹⁶⁰ More promising, perhaps, is the evolutionary, bottom-up approach toward achieving human-level minds.¹⁶¹ In that method, researchers create computer programs or artificial creatures within a digitally controlled environment and challenge those creatures to adapt or evolve to changes in that environment.¹⁶² In theory, more intelligent artificial creatures will thrive and evolve increasingly toward a human-level intelligence.¹⁶³ In practice, the A.I. life currently in existence has exhibited the [33 ELR 10273] ability to learn, such as the robot-insects created by Rodney Brooks' center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who have learned through experience how to walk over rough terrain.¹⁶⁴

Despite all the advances A.I. has made, at the current stage of technology the brains of computers are still a million times simpler than the human brain.¹⁶⁵ Kurzweil estimates that the brains of computers at the present time are equivalent to that of insects.¹⁶⁶ Both the current generation of machines and insects, for the most part, live by a pre-programmed, overriding instinct that appears to completely control their actions.¹⁶⁷ As previously discussed, the welfare of insects falls near the bottom in the priorities of animal rights' activists and in the law's protection.¹⁶⁸ In contrast to such simple beings, the essence of higher level life is the ability to possess "consciousness." The ability to experience is the essence of "consciousness," which is a sense of self-awareness about the self and the surrounding world.¹⁶⁹ To elaborate, consciousness equates to: "I think therefore I am, or I feel therefore I am," combined with a self-awareness that one's self is in the process of thinking or feeling.¹⁷⁰

Kurzweil, who has a strong track record of reliable technology predictions, predicts that there will be A.I. beings with a human-level degree of consciousness within 30 years.¹⁷¹ In pursuit of that, the A.I. field is focusing on creating A.I. life that will be able to master "fuzzy logic," which is reasoning without a clear right or wrong answer.¹⁷²

As for current environmental implications, A.I. has power to mitigate harm to the environment and to humans. In the 1980s, humans used A.I. computer programs to assist in the evaluation of claims in asbestos litigation.¹⁷³ This form of A.I., known as "expert systems," consists of computer programs that solve highly complex problems within a narrow topic of inquiry at the same level of ability as a human, using a database of expert knowledge.¹⁷⁴ Expert systems consist of a knowledge base, an engine that draws inferences based on that knowledge base, and explanatory and informational material to be provided to the user.¹⁷⁵ Further, within recent years, the University of Georgia has operated expert systems to assist the U.S. Forest Service in managing environmental resources.¹⁷⁶

Future generations of A.I. beings will be able to think beyond the limits of the human mind.¹⁷⁷ The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence envisions an A.I. mind that will not only think faster than humans but also think in fundamentally different ways, becoming a super-genius and thus seeing solutions that are literally inconceivable by the human mind.¹⁷⁸ Such an A.I. being will develop a unique awareness and ability to improve the inner workings of its own mind by modifying its source code.¹⁷⁹ According to the Law of Accelerating Returns, each new generation of A.I. will build upon itself in a rapidly spiraling path of technological and intellectual progress.¹⁸⁰ Such an advanced mind may be able to bring about the "Singularity," which is an era in which the development of technology will infinitely increase, thus creating the ability to change existence as we know it.¹⁸¹ The Singularity is that point where all is utterly unknown, infinitely frightening and exhilarating at the same time: a monumental turning point in human civilization constituting its end or a new beginning. Such an exponential growth in technology would easily transform human existence more than even the adoption of agriculture or the industrial revolution.

Whoever controls this new force will control the destiny of humanity.¹⁸² In the coming years, the technologies stemming from the A.I. mind could eradicate pollution and create ways in which humans can peacefully co-exist with other species. For instance, advanced A.I. may be able to create nanotechnology robots.¹⁸³ Nanobots are incredibly small robots built on the atomic level through the manipulation of atoms and molecules, such technology being called nanotechnology.¹⁸⁴ The goal of nanotechnology is [33 ELR 10274] to build self-replicating nanobots.¹⁸⁵ With self-replicating nanobots, the controller of those robots has the power to transform the environment, eliminating the need for polluting technologies and allowing for incredible feats of environmental engineering such as rebuilding the ozone layer.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, some A.I. theorists contend that nanobots will need to be intelligent in order to take full advantage of their abilities.¹⁸⁷

Moreover, with the new technologies humans will be able to greatly increase their life-spans by modifying deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to cease the aging process or even reverse aging.¹⁸⁸ The new technologies may allow enough food to feed all the starving people in the world.¹⁸⁹ But grave consequences may flow from even such a patently benign act. More people on an already crowded world means greater conflict and war over a limited amount of land and consequently much greater loss of the environment along with the loss of so-called lower level species.

Although new technologies may make it possible for all humans to have a wealth of material possessions, the limitless possibilities of these technologies will force us to ask if that is the point of western civilization. If humans direct A.I. beings toward technologies that will exponentially increase the world population, perhaps merely 50 times more than the present population of 6 billion, combined with the spread of the consumer materialistic-based culture of industrialized nations, with two cars for each family, that could bring about a huge increase in environmental damage. Even the conservative humanist philosopher Luc Ferry agrees that it is not the ultimate goal of civilization just to build better cars and televisions.¹⁹⁰ Thus, humans should take care in the design of A.I. beings to carefully contemplate what they wish to achieve with the next technological revolution. For instance, in the genre of science fiction, visionaries see a utopia in which all the basic needs of every human have been fulfilled and the goal of human existence is not the accumulation of material wealth but the search for knowledge.¹⁹¹

B. Designing "Green A.I."

Some humans are already planning the values of the future generation of high-level A.I. beings.¹⁹² At stake is whether these powerful A.I. beings will be environmentally friendly "green A.I." or be devoid of environmental values.

One articulation of future A.I. beings foreshadows the role of environmental values, in particular the "precautionary principle."¹⁹³ As with rationally thinking humans, A.I. beings follow the principle of maximizing their expected utility.¹⁹⁴ Under a common formulation of the precautionary principle, actions involving even a small risk of catastrophic harm, such as an environmental catastrophe, are prohibited or delayed until a safer course of action can be found.¹⁹⁵ A.I. theorists conceive that autonomous A.I. beings can be preserved from falling prey to catastrophic harm by pre-programming them with certain safeguards.¹⁹⁶ To avoid catastrophic harm, programmers may skew the A.I. interpretation of data, thus making it believe the utility is much lower than it is in actuality.¹⁹⁷ Alternatively, they might disable it from taking a potentially catastrophic course of action when the possibility of the catastrophe reaches a certain point, taking into account the reliability of the source of information.¹⁹⁸ A third option is to prohibit certain actions based on their negative impact on society in general, or its lack of "global utility."¹⁹⁹

As to goal or value systems, more than 50 years ago, in I, Robot, science-fiction writer Isaac Asimov first set forth his laws of robotics.²⁰⁰ Designed to protect humans against a robot revolution at the hands of their intelligent robots, Asimov's laws commanded the following:

1. A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm;

2. A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; and

3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.²⁰¹

Experience with Asimov's strict rules led to non-sensical results, such as a robot being prohibited from harming one or a few humans even when necessary to protect the whole of humanity.²⁰² Accordingly, Asimov revised his rules to set forth a superceding, "zeroeth" law: "Humanity as a whole is more important than a single human being …. A robot may [33 ELR 10275] not injure humanity, or through inaction, allow humanity to come to harm."²⁰³

Although the current generation of A.I. beings is not yet capable of even understanding Asimov's rules of robotics,²⁰⁴ it seems inevitable that future A.I. beings will.²⁰⁵ Already, people such as A.I. designer and theorist, Ben Geortzel, are planning the moral values of A.I. beings.²⁰⁶ As previously discussed, A.I. beings' superhuman potential will be seen when, thinking on a human level, they exploit their awareness of their own source code and begin to create more advanced minds through self-modification.²⁰⁷ During the process of self-modification, Geortzel predicts that A.I. beings are more likely to rewrite or even delete rigidly structured rules.²⁰⁸ In contrast, he sees more abstract "basic values" as more likely to survive.²⁰⁹ Flowing from those values will be specific, derived rules. For instance, if a basic value is to "value life" then a derived rule from that may be to abolish the death penalty.²¹⁰

Goertzel offers a set of basic values which embraces including not only human welfare but also green values, including the welfare of trees, protozoa, dolphins, and even diversity itself.²¹¹ Geortzel's basic values for A.I. beings include: create diversity; preserve and foster the growth of life (both intelligent and unintelligent); create new patterns in the world and in the mind; preserve existing patterns that have often proved valuable in some way; make other intelligent or living systems happy (compassion)—the happiness and continued existence of humans; and to keep itself healthy.²¹²

Ironically, it follows from Goertzel's basic values approach that it may be better to program a more abstract rule such as "value life" rather than a more specific rule such as "value human life."²¹³ The more abstract rule of valuing all life is more likely to survive the self-modification process.²¹⁴ Accordingly, humans may be ultimately protecting themselves by writing a rule that protects all life instead of humans alone.

Although Goertzel's system of placing abstract values at the top of the hierarchy may have merit, that is not to say that A.I. beings should be oblivious to history. Take for example assigning an A.I. being with the apparently benign, but vaguely defined goal of improving the "quality of life" of humans. With their tremendous power, future A.I. beings may achieve that goal by abandoning sustainable use concepts and engaging in unrestrained short-term growth to promote quality of life for the present generation of humans. They could destroy all the forests to create a temporary abundance of fuel, housing, and also food through creation of croplands and grazing fields, drastically inflating the standard of living of all humans currently in existence. However, future generations of humans would bear the devastating effects of such a short-sighted and unsustainable course of action.

Throughout the past few millennia in dealing with technology, humans have learned hard lessons in dealing with their neglect of the environment.²¹⁵ They have suffered great loss as they have been forced by necessity to adopt environmental values by trial and error.²¹⁶ In creating a new intelligent, conscious, and potentially self-sufficient form of life—one that stands to be the most powerful technological force yet—humans should not forsake these hard-earned values. Environmentalists should involve themselves in ensuring that environmental values are integrated into A.I. beings' value system and given consideration on par with other values.

In contrast to Goertzel's approach, A.I. theorist Eliezer Yudkowsky of the Singularity Institute sets forth a competing design for A.I.²¹⁷ Rather than programming a list of values into A.I., Yudkowsky proposes one "supergoal" of "friendliness," and would have A.I. beings determine their subordinate "subgoals" to reaching friendliness.²¹⁸ He further distances himself from the authority to program moral values into A.I. beings by proposing that the goal of "friendliness" should be based on what he calls "pan/human" attributes.²¹⁹ Such "pan/human" attributes would be based on values shared by at least 99% of the human population.²²⁰ Yudkowsky provides "altruism" as an example of what A.I. beings might find to be a friendly attribute toward humanity.²²¹

However, such pan/human values neglect to take into account the rights of A.I. beings. It may be that 99% or more of humans may agree that conscious A.I. beings should lack the basic liberties of humans so as to be completely shackled to the will of humans and that the lives of A.I. beings should be reduced to creatures of absolute or near-absolute servitude.

[33 ELR 10276]

VI. The Co-Evolution of Humans and Machines: Reflections for the Animal Rights Movement

A. The Next Generation of A.I.

Although the minds of the current generation of A.I. beings are on the level of insects, perhaps as soon as within 20 years A.I. beings will be capable of complex thought on the same level as humans. But even then there may be marked differences between the next generation of A.I. beings and humans. Even then advanced A.I. beings might not have emotions. They might not feel pain and pleasure in the same way as humans. The animal rights movement will have to choose whether these artificial beings deserve consideration.²²²

Singer's Animal Liberation, the bible of the animal rights movement, is premised on the protection of non-human animals because of their capacity to feel pain. Singer even goes so far as to say, with emphasis: "The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way."²²³ Although that declaration requires an animal to have the capacity to feel as a prerequisite for having recognizable interests, Animal Liberation is focused primarily on organic life instead of artificial life. Singer seems to value the requirement of being able to feel pleasure and pain based on the fact that these sensations are the product of millions of years of evolution, and one can infer that he believes this evolutionary origin makes pain and pleasure reliable indicators of the interests of an animal.²²⁴ In Animal Liberation, Singer specifically distinguishes the nervous systems of robots that cannot feel pain.²²⁵ Under this part of Singer's philosophy, robots without the ability to feel pain or pleasure would not deserve the concern of humans.²²⁶

Nevertheless, Singer also emphasizes that arbitrary differences between species of different animals should not defeat them from deserving the concern of humans. Under the prevailing animal rights hierarchy, species more similar to humans, such as apes, stand on a higher level in the hierarchy of concern for other life. Arguably, the achievement of an A.I. mind capable of human-level thought will make such a species more similar to humans than any other creature, even without the capacity of emotion.²²⁷ Such A.I. beings would be able to converse with humans, propose solutions to societal problems, and contribute to society. Critics of non-human animal rights point out that non-humans lack the capacity to do what distinguishes humans from other animals: the capacity to innovate, to create technology, and to reason.²²⁸ In contrast to other non-human animals, future A.I. beings stand to master these unique "human" characteristics. Accordingly, in order to avoid a speciesist, arbitrary exclusion of emotionless A.I. beings from the circle of concern, animal rights activities must adopt concern for the welfare of advanced A.I. beings.²²⁹

But that leads one to ask, if A.I. beings cannot feel pain or pleasure, what are their interests? Pain and pleasure are merely indicators of whether an animals' goals are being satisfied or thwarted. For instance, an animal such as a bear has a base interest in survival. A bear with its leg caught in a trap feels pain so that it knows it is bleeding, injured, and possibly at risk of losing its life. If the bear were unconscious, its threat would not be any less real. As for pleasure, sexual pleasure promotes reproduction and thus furthers the continued existence of the species by fulfilling the desires of the individual. Therefore, pain and pleasure serve useful functions in the survival of an organic life-form and in the evolutionary success of a species. For humans, their dominant moral systems, such as mainstream religions, would agree that satisfying desires and avoiding pain is not the ultimate or sole purpose of human life, but instead human existence should be directed toward the fulfillment of moral goals. Pleasure and the avoidance of pain is not necessarily an end in itself. As with humans, advanced A.I. beings will have goals and as such will have an interest in fulfilling those goals, whether they are to ensure its own survival or to fulfill the needs of society. If an A.I. being is deactivated or "killed," then its interest in survival has been thwarted. If an A.I. being is "starved" for lack of power and this interferes with the fulfillment of its goals, then its interest in fulfilling its purpose has been thwarted.

Of great concern, however, will be the creation of a slave race of A.I. beings, capable of thought on a human level but forced to obey due to their programming.²³⁰ Although it seems reasonable to impose some safeguards against these powerful beings from being able to eliminate humanity, the creation of conscious A.I. beings will force humans to examine their moral obligation to grant these beings at least some basic liberty rights.²³¹

The imaginations of science-fiction writers have already envisioned the legal drama that will unfold when A.I. beings demand their constitutional rights in a court of law.²³² A [33 ELR 10277] powerful portrayal of the impending conflict plays out in "The Measure of a Man," an episode of "Star Trek: The Next Generation."²³³ The science-fiction television series, "Star Trek: The Next Generation" often focused on the android character of "Data," who aspired to be human. He played a role as a fully-functional member of the ship's crew, although he differed from them by being capable of incredibly fast calculations, superhuman strength, and lacking in emotions.²³⁴ Nevertheless, he was "human" in many ways, as he built friendships with his shipmates, had his own unique personality, and thought and acted independently.²³⁵

Despite Data's "human" qualities, a superior research officer ordered him to be transferred for invasive and dangerous experiments.²³⁶ Those experiments would have been performed with the goal of learning how to build more "Datas."²³⁷ Rather than comply with the orders, he decided to resign his position as an officer in Starfleet.²³⁸ In response, the researcher declared Data to be his "property," and thus without rights.²³⁹

In determining Data's right of freedom, the parties turned to the adversarial legal system, where they debated whether he was entitled to fundamental rights.²⁴⁰ Data's detractors emphasized his differences, making him bend steel pipes, detaching one of his arms, and finally, flipping a switch to deactivate him.²⁴¹ In contrast, his advocate emphasized his "human" qualities: that he is self-aware; capable of complex thought and reasoning; has friends; keeps mementoes such as medals; and has had sex.²⁴²

Perhaps most significant in Data's ordeal was the slavery issue. The specter of slavery arose when threatened with the possibility that Starfleet might build a race of Datas, who as property would be subjected to serving humans.²⁴³ This led to the following point of wisdom:

In the history of many worlds there have always been disposable creatures. They do the dirty work. They do the work that no one else wants to do because it's too difficult or too hazardous. And an army of Datas, all disposable … you don't have to think about their welfare, you don't think about how they feel. Whole generations of disposable people.²⁴⁴

But in thinking about a conscious A.I. beings' "welfare," what is the welfare of an A.I. being who is designed to have the sole purpose of serving humanity? The answer is that it is morally wrong to build conscious, intelligent "slaves" to humanity, whose differences are mainly arbitrary. These essentially "human" creatures deserve at least some minimal rights of freedom. Although humans may fool themselves into believing that they will be enlightened dictators and slave-masters, our history with slavery tells a different story. In the words of a famous animal rights activist: "The less able a group is to stand up and organize against oppression, the more easily it is oppressed."²⁴⁵ Those are the words of Singer.²⁴⁶

B. Co-Evolution of Humans and A.I.

Scientists predict there will be a co-evolution between A.I. beings and humans, possibly in the near future.²⁴⁷ This has already begun as humans adopt more artificial technology into their bodies, such as artificial hearts, and develop A.I. beings that will possess the qualities of higher level organic life, such as emotions, sexuality, and spirituality.²⁴⁸

Already, the revolution from human to transhuman has begun. Recently, the world saw the creation of the first cyborg: the integration of human and machine into one body.²⁴⁹ This was achieved when Prof. Kevin Warwick underwent surgery in Oxford, England, connecting his nervous system to a computer.²⁵⁰ In doing so, surgeons implanted a silicon square into an incision in his wrist and attached electrodes into a nerve.²⁵¹ In a similar vein, scientists recently turned rats into "robots" by using implanted electrodes to control their movements by remote control.²⁵² Predicted already is that humans in the future will be able to download their minds into a robot's body.²⁵³ Having a backup copy of one's mind would allow humans to become immortals.²⁵⁴ Immediately, the mind swims with the possibilities. Imagine a nuclear attack that kills millions of people and then having the ability to reverse that horrible loss of life by constructing new bodies and reloading the backup copies of their minds. To go even further, perhaps the new age marriage will consist of an actual fusion of two minds, integrated together as one. Alternatively, groups of people might join their minds together as one to fulfill a utopian vision of communal oneness with society.²⁵⁵

[33 ELR 10278]

Technology could also lead humans to a more enlightened emotional state. For many years legal theorists have dreamed of an A.I. judge, devoid of any bias or prejudice.²⁵⁶ If an A.I. being will be able to sense every aspect of its mental being,²⁵⁷ then perhaps a human whose mind is down-loaded into an A.I. brain, thus becoming a cyborg, will be able to do the same. Imagine being able to delete unwanted aspects of one's deep-rooted beliefs or personality, such as a racist being able to purge all prejudice from his or her mind.²⁵⁸ Famed trial lawyer Gerry Spence notes humans' inherent bias toward their own, individual interests.²⁵⁹ He depicts a hypothetical in which a logger is cross-examined as to his economic bias in preserving his job and his lack of regard for the old growth forest and its species, which are a product of millions of years of evolution.²⁶⁰ With an A.I. brain, that logger might be able to temporarily mute his personal bias to look at the situation from an objective point of view.

Kurzweil, among others, predicts that in the future there will be a new breed of A.I. beings who will kneel down in church to pray, possess emotions, and have sexual sensations.²⁶¹ At that point it will be extremely difficult to justify denying basic "human" rights to such A.I. beings, whose only difference may be physical ones, as it will also be difficult to justify denying the rights to former humans who have become "transhuman." Once humans finally recognize the rights of A.I. beings, that day will present a victory for the animal rights movement by breaking the artificial "human" barrier.²⁶² Ironically, however, this event will lead to a rethinking of Congress' goal that the Animal Welfare Act replace organic animals with computer simulations.²⁶³ Consistent with the hierarchy of animal welfare interests, humans and those A.I. beings who are conscious to a similar degree as humans will stand at the top levels of consideration, whereas rats, insects, and the current generation of A.I. computers will stand near the bottom of that hierarchy. Following the hierarchy in favor of greater rights for higher level life forms, it will be immoral to subject conscious A.I. beings to dangerous experiments without their consent.

As humans evolve into transhumans and upon development of A.I. beings with a human-level degree of consciousness, it will also become increasingly difficult to justify treating these beings as non-persons, undeserving of any rights. With the possibility of humans becoming immortal by becoming transhumans, as predicted by Kurzweil, the current species of humanity is likely to become a minority.²⁶⁴ Humans, fearing the so-called robot revolution, may give in to fear by imposing harsh restrictions on the freedoms and thinking processes of A.I. beings, making them their slaves. Although future generations of A.I. beings, with their enhanced mental capacities, will likely be more powerful than humans, A.I. theorists such as Yudkowsky postulate that a carefully designed A.I. being will actually be friendlier toward humanity than humans are to each other.²⁶⁵ He points out that hostility and violent tendencies are the products of millions of years of human evolution.²⁶⁶ According to Yudkowsky such tendencies will not likely appear in A.I. beings out of thin air unless programmed into them.²⁶⁷

Although it may be prudent to ensure that A.I. beings do not run amok and go on a destructive rampage, the solution is to create reasonable boundaries on A.I. beings' ability to harm humans instead of totally enslaving them or disabling their ability to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of speech. In creating A.I. beings' moral structure, however, humans should teach them respect for all life, not just human or A.I. life. After all, as A.I. beings evolve into more advanced forms, the current version of the human species will increasingly look inferior compared to them and in the distant future humans may even be considered more like an insect.²⁶⁸ When that day arrives, humans will wish they had taught A.I. beings to have consideration for all life.²⁶⁹ It is only prudent that humans should program basic values into A.I. beings toward the welfare of different life-forms, although humans should still avoid mandating that conscious A.I. beings become their slaves. Furthermore, humans in the presence of A.I. beings who can learn by following humans' [33 ELR 10279] examples, may wish to lead by example by caring more for the welfare of "lesser" species.

C. Future Allocation of Rights and Resources

In the future, as when they encountered the Neanderthals, humans will once again share the company of highly intelligent and technologically advanced beings, which will consist of A.I. life and transhumans. As for how the respective rights of these beings will develop, there is no easy democratic solution. The Court sees "one person, one vote" as essential to democracy in the United States.²⁷⁰ However, the principle of "one person, one vote" may not be as fair with the possibility of A.I. beings who can quickly copy their programming to create new A.I. beings, thus allowing for a limitless number of possible registered voters. As A.I. beings are based on computer programs, it follows that they will be able to quickly copy and modify themselves, thus procreating much faster than humans and eventually outnumbering them. Just to take nanobots as an example, A.I. theorists maintain that nanobots, which are machines built on the atomic level, will work best if they are conscious and if they possess the ability to replicate themselves.²⁷¹

Further complicating the situation is the nebulous status of quasi-conscious A.I. beings, those in the middle stages between a mere toaster and a highly advanced, clearly recognizable consciousness. Such A.I. beings may be the equivalent to humans with diminished capacity, such as young children or a mentally impaired "idiot savant."²⁷² Under human society, such beings traditionally deserve the affection and love of "normal" humans and their diminished capacity does not justify terminating their lives.²⁷³ In the philosophy of utilitarianism, society respects the welfare of these individuals, as caring for them furthers the happiness and fulfillment of the goals of "normal" humans.²⁷⁴ Most perplexing perhaps, may be the future multi-agent systems, in which several independent A.I. beings of varying degrees of consciousness, temporarily or perhaps permanently share their programming with each other or merge their minds to fulfill a common good.²⁷⁵ This may entail a communal society in which some individuals have surrendered some of their independence to the communal system, communal consciousness, or "being," but still retain a quasi-individualized essence or mind. The resulting systems may easily include thousands or even millions of "persons." Surely, such a being would have greater needs and thus need greater rights to energy or property than a tiny nanobot.

One possible solution to the allocation of voting rights may be to grant more votes to multi-agent systems than to an ordinary person. In an analogous situation, legal commentators have persuasively argued that voters with minor children may be entitled to a more heavily weighted vote in order to further the interests of their minor children who cannot vote.²⁷⁶ Those entities who can contribute more to society's progress and prosperity may be entitled to a greater share of the voting rights.

VII. Conclusion

So the force of technology will sweep the animal rights movement and environmentalists in new directions. Environmentalists will find great ecological value in the advent of eco-friendly animals and animal-less meat. Many animal rights activists may follow Singer's lead and prefer a world of painless animals or animal-less meat to a world in which animals suffer, aware of their own pain. But technology will create new beings of human-level and above intelligence, such as the future generations of A.I. beings. Under the hierarchy of animal rights activists, A.I. beings will deserve strong protection from being oppressed by humanity. Nevertheless, in creating these powerful beings, humans should also take care to instill their hard-earned environmental values into A.I. beings' moral framework and teach them respect for other life-forms.

1. JARED DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE: THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE HUMAN ANIMAL 33 (1993) [hereinafter DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE].

2. RICHARD LEAKEY, THE ORIGIN OF HUMANKIND 40-41, 54-55 (1994).

3. DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 1, at 34, 36. Diamond also theorizes that Australopithecus africanus may have pushed its humanoid competitor, Australopithecus robustus, into extinction by killing it for meat. Id.

4. Id. at 47.

5. Id. at 35, 41-45.

6. Id. at 44.

7. Id. at 38.

8. Id. at 42.

9. Id. at 41.

10. Id. at 41.

11. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 40 (1999) [hereinafter DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL]; DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 1, at 54-56, 364.

12. DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 1, at 47-48.

13. Id. at 52.

14. CHARLES L. REDMAN, HUMAN IMPACT ON ANCIENT ENVIRONMENTS 75-80 (1999).

15. Id. at 79-80.

16. Id.

17. DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL, supra note 11, at 354-59.

18. MARVIN HARRIS, GOOD TO EAT: RIDDLES OF FOOD AND CULTURE 199-234 (1998).

19. DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL, supra note 11, at 354-59.

20. Id. at 354-59.

21. Id.

22. Id. at 210-11.

23. HARRIS supra note 18, at 47-87.

24. Id.

25. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 185-212 (3d ed. 2002); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 4-5, 9-34 (2000). But see Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis. 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1506-08, 1522-26 (2001) (book review of Wise's Rattling the Cage, noting a few exceptions).

26. SINGER, supra note 25, at 5.

27. Id. at 5, 7-8; Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 1523-25.

28. SINGER, supra note 25, at 7; Nussbaum, supra note 25, at 1524.

29. SINGER, supra note 25, at xv. The 2002 edition of Animal Liberation also provides a description of animal rights achievements since 1975. Id. at ix-xiv.

30. Id. at 9.

31. Id. at 25-157.

32. Id. at 231.

33. Id. at 235.

34. Id. at 236.

35. Id. at 8-9.

36. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1653 (Deluxe 2d ed. 1983).

37. SINGER, supra note 25, at 7 (emphasis in original).

38. Stephen Burr. Student Article, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 205, 217-20 (1975).

39. Id. at 228.

40. Rowan Taylor, A Step at a Time: New Zealand's Progress Toward Hominid Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 35, 35-36 (2001).

41. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 21 (1991).

42. Id. at 21 n.2.

43. LUC FERRY, THE NEW ECOLOGICAL ORDER 6 (Carol Volk trans., 1995).

44. SINGER, supra note 25, at xiii.

45. THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1996); The Great Ape Project, About the Great Ape Project, at http://www.greatapeproject.org/gapintroduction.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).

46. The Great Ape Project, A Declaration on Great Apes, at http://www.greatapeproject.org/gapintroduction.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).

47. SINGER, supra note 25, at xiii, 231.

48. Id. at xiii.

49. Id. at xiv.

50. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 25, at 267-68. See also Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and Legal Welfarism: "Unnecessary" Suffering and the "Humane" Treatment of Animals, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 721 (1994) (a harsh criticism of the treatment of animals due to their status as property); ADAM KOLBER, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163 (2001) (arguing in favor of expansive standing to sue for apes based on the Great Ape Project and Rattling the Cage).

51. STEVEN WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 30-32 (2002).

52. Id. at 32.

53. Id. at 32.

54. Id. at 36, 241.

55. Id. at 36-37, 43-45, 241.

56. Id. at 29-30.

57. See Brian Cantrell, Karen Davis: 9/11 Attacks May Have Reduced Pain and Suffering of Chickens, at http://www.AnimalRights.Net/articles/2002/000002.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002) (citing and quoting Peter Singer, Review of Joan Dunayer's Animal Equality: Language and Liberty, VEGAN VOICE (Dec. 2001/Feb. 2002)).

58. Cantrell, supra note 57.

59. Id.

60. Karen Davis, United Poultry Concerns, An Open Letter to Vegan Voice, Re: Singer's Disparagement of Chickens, at http://www.upc-online.org/011226vegan_voice_singer.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).

61. Id.

62. See also DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 1, at 30 (recognizing the animal rights movement's prioritizing of their concern for higher level life-forms such as cats, dogs, and primates, above mice, and their general silence about the welfare of insects and bacteria).

63. Id. (regarding insects); see SINGER, supra note 25, at 7-8 (concluding that a stone has no interests at all).

64. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 41, at 30-32; Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 468-69 (1999).

65. Francione, supra note 50, at 751; Nicole Fox, The Inadequate Protection of Animals Against Cruel Animal Husbandry Practices Under United States Law, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 145, 158 (1995).

66. Francione, supra note 50, at 750-51.

67. See generally WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 25; Francione, supra note 50, at 750.

68. Francione, supra note 50, at 751.

69. See id. at 750-51.

70. Id. at 757-69.

71. Id. at 749-69.

72. Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law's Role in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 46-50, 54-58 (2001); Joseph Sauder, Enacting and Enforcing Felony Animal Cruelty Laws to Prevent Violence Against Humans, 6 ANIMAL L. 1, 10-15 (2000); Susan Crowell, Animal Cruelty as It Relates to Child Abuse: Shedding Light on a "Hidden" Problem, 20 J. JUV. L. 38, 43-49 (1999).

73. See FERRY, supra note 43, at 91-107 (revealing that the Nazis enacted endangered species and animal cruelty legislation but were still an unfathomably cruel regime toward humans).

74. Bradley Bobertz, Of Nature and Nazis, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 353, 385-88 (1997).

75. As has been noted by well-known conservative Judge Richard A. Posner, the Nazis also supported laws in favor of highways but that does not necessarily mean that people should stop building highways. Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 536 (2000) (book review of Wise's Rattling the Cage).

76. See FERRY, supra note 43, at 105; Bobertz, supra note 74, at 359.

77. FERRY, supra note 43, at 105 (miscegenation laws); Bobertz, supra note 74, at 393 n.184 (the Nuremberg citizenship laws of 1935).

78. Bobertz, supra note 74, at 353 n.1.

79. Id. at 389-91, 393 & n.184.

80. 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74; U.S. Department of Agriculture, History of the Animal Welfare Act (describing the Twenty-Eight Hour Law as the first federal law protecting non-human animals from cruel or abusive treatment), at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/awahistory.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002); see Fox, Comment, supra note 65, at 159.

81. Fox, supra note 65, at 160 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 71).

82. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 71).

83. Id. at 159, 162 (citing Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 94, 106 (1911)).

84. Id. at 162 (citing Baltimore & Ohio, 220 U.S. at 106).

85. 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1999); see Fox, supra note 65, at 163-64.

86. Fox, supra note 65, at 164-65.

87. Joseph Mendelson III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing Under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 800-01 (1997) (discussing the AWA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159).

88. Mendelson, supra note 87, at 796-98; Fox, supra note 65, at 166.

89. 9 C.F.R. § 1.1 (definition of "animal") (implementing 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)).

90. Id.

91. Mendelson, supra note 87, at 799-800.

92. SINGER, supra note 25, at 80-81; Mendelson, supra note 87, at 799 & n.38.

93. SINGER, supra note 25, at 81; Mendelson, supra note 87, at 799 n.38.

94. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B), implemented by, 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.80-3.92, especially § 3.81; see Fox, supra note 65, at 167.

95. Mendelson, supra note 87, at 800 (citing 137 CONG. REC. E1295 (1991)).

96. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, ELR STAT. ESA §§ 2-18.

97. Petersen, supra note 64, at 471.

98. Andrew E. Wetzler, The Ethical Underpinnings of the Endangered Species Act, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 170-74 (1993).

99. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3), ELR STAT. ESA § 2(a)(3) (congressional findings that species have ecological, educational, historical, and scientific value, in addition to their esthetic and recreational values); see Wetzler, supra note 98, at 168-70.

100. Oliver A. Houck; Environmental Law in Cuba, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 48 (2000); John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1208, 1215 (1998); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act—A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 852-53, 853 n.31 (1997); Wetzler, supra note 98, at 168-70. See also, e.g., Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge, and Profit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy and the Core Purposes of America's National Parks, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401 (1999) (concerns the discovery of a unique form of microbe that can live in some of the most alien environments known).

101. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings," 80 IOWA L. REV. 297, 308-28 (1995); Nagle, supra note 100, at 1210-11; Plater, supra note 100, at 853-54.

102. Petersen, supra note 64, at 471; Wetzler, supra note 98, at 169.

103. Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to Protect the Whole of Creation, 2 ANIMAL L. 1 (1996); Nagle, supra note 100, at 1216-21.

104. Nagle, supra note 100, at 1197-1202.

105. Id. at 1197.

106. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), ELR STAT. ESA § 3(6) (defining "endangered species"); see Nagle, supra note 100, at 1193-94. See also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, ELR STAT. FIFRA §§ 2-34, defining "pest" to mean "any insect, rodent, nematode, fungus, weed" or other plants, animals, and micro-organisms determined to be injurious to health or the environment. Id. § 136(t).

107. GREGORY S. PAUL & EARL D. COX, BEYOND HUMANITY: CYBEREVOLUTION AND FUTURE MINDS 156 (1996). See also WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 388; WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 25, at 125-28.

108. Caroline P. Rogers, Solution or Stumbling Block?: Biological Engineering and the Modern Extinction Crisis, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 141, 153 (2001). See also Robert F. Bloomquist, Cloning Endangered Animal Species?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 383 (1998); Corey A. Salsberg, Student Article, Resurrecting the Wooly Mammoth: Science, Law, Ethics, Politics, and Religion, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (both discuss the cloning of endangered species).

109. Rogers, supra note 108, at 141, 153.

110. Nagle, supra note 100, at 1214.

111. Wetzler, supra note 98, at 170-74.

112. See Nagle, supra note 100, at 1209-10; Petersen, supra note 64, at 479-81 (discussing the so-called charismatic megafauna).

113. Plater, supra note 100, at 875: admission by the attorney who convinced the Court to save the endangered snail darter species from a dam project in Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 8 ELR 20513 (1978).

114. SINGER, supra note 25, at 129-35.

115. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).

116. Id. at 99-105 (describing the unhealthy conditions of chickens kept in unnaturally crowded conditions).

117. See Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 267, 299 (1995) ("Biotechnology should not be used to impoverish creatures, to strip away their capacities, or to diminish the richness of their lives.").

Nevertheless, despite depriving non-human animals of their sentience, including the ability to feel pleasure, and subjecting their bodies to actual physical harms, Singer would argue that such a turn of events would actually be a victory for the animal rights movement, E-mail from Peter Singer to the Author (July 15, 2002) (on file with the author). Without the capacity to suffer, Singer contends that humans should no longer feel obligated to feel compassion for such animals' plight, Id. In particular, Singer writes, "I didn't find much to disagree with, except the puzzling claim … that creating unconscious veal calves would somehow be the defeat or dimunition of my moral imperative. On the contrary, it would be its triumph. Then I could stop worrying about veal calves, and other farm animals, and take up another cause." Id.

118. Ray Kurzweil, Human Cloning Is the Least of It (originally published as a message in WIRED magazine's Future List on January 9, 2001), available at http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html? main=/articles/art0097.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002). Kurzweil predicts: "The advent of animal-less meat will … eliminate animal suffering." Id.

119. See SINGER, supra note 25, at 7-8 (explaining that a rock does not have an interest against being kicked along a road in contrast to an animal, which can feel pain); see infra Part III.

120. SINGER, supra note 25, at 228. Significantly, Singer notes that this is the only philosophical change he has made to his philosophy since the first edition of Animal Liberation, Id. at 228. See also Francis Pizzulli, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476, 536-41 (1974) (theorizing that the tort of "wrongful life" may apply to the cloning of humans). But see Hettinger, supra note 117, at 299 ("Biotechnology should not be used to impoverish creatures, to strip away their capacities, or to diminish the richness of their lives.").

121. Kurzweil, Human Cloning Is the Least of It, supra note 118. See also REDMAN, supra note 14, at 41-42 (explaining the loss of energy as it passes each step through the food chain).

122. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).

123. Id. at 309.

124. Id. at 305.

125. Id. at 316-18.

126. James R. Chiapetta, D.V.M., Of Mice and Machine: A Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation of the Patent Statute, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 155, 172-73, 175 (1994); Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 465-66 (1989).

127. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).

128. See id.

129. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Lifeforms: The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1065-68 (1988) (concluding that every technology from nuclear power to biotechnology entails risks but the solution is not to prohibit patents on the technologies but to engage in environmental regulation of the applications of such technology, where needed).

130. Hettinger, supra note 117, at 300.

131. Transgenic Fish Could Threaten Wild Populations, at http://news.uns.purdue.edu/html4ever/0002.Muir.trojan.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).

132. Id. See also Beth Daley, Escaped Farm Salmon Raise Alarm in Maine, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2001, at A1 (reporting the accidental release of 100,000 farm-raised salmon into rivers with wild, endangered salmon).

133. Id.; Daley, supra note 132. See also Dorothy W. Bisbee, Preparing for a Blue Revolution: Regulating the Environmental Release of Transgenic Fish, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 625, 647-50 (1993).

134. See generally GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS: ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS (Deborah K. Letourneau & Beth Elpern Burrows eds., 2002).

135. Id.

136. Steven Milloy, Butterfly "Survivor," at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,830,00.html (Feb. 2, 2001) (reporting great attention by mainstream media outlets such as CBS News and USA Today).

137. Associated Press, EPA Calls Biotech Corn No Threat: Farmers Can Keep Growing Genetically Engineered Crop, WASH. POST. Oct. 17, 2001, at A8.

138. Id.

139. Id.; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Research Q & A: Bt Corn and Monarch Butterflies, at http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/br/btcorn/index.html#btl (last visited May 19, 2002).

140. Associated Press, supra note 137, at A8.

141. Id.

142. Id.

143. See generally GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS, supra note 134.

144. Mark Kaufmann, Alter Genes, Risk an Ecosystem?, WASH. POST, June 4, 2001, at A7.

145. Id.

146. Id.

147. Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 443-44 (1999).

148. See GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS, supra note 134, at 17 (observing that an unexpectedly high level of public skepticism over transgenic crops has prompted many biotechnology corporations to make expensive revisions to their research and marketing strategies).

149. Magnani, supra note 147, at 443. See also Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising From Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 247 (2000); James P. Daniel, Of Mice and "Manimal": The Patent and Trademark Office's Latest Stance Against Patent Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL, PROP. L. 99 (1999); Barry S. Edwards, "… And on His Farm He Had a Jeep": Patenting Transgenic Animals, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89 (2001); Mark Jagels, Dr. Moreau Has Left the Island: Dealing With Human-Animal Patents in the 21st Century, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 115 (2000); Dana Visser, Who's Going to Stop Me From Patenting My Six-Legged Chicken? An Analysis of the Moral Utility Doctrine in the United States, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 2067 (2000).

150. Magnani, supra note 147, at 446.

151. Id. at 443.

152. Id.

153. Jagels, supra note 149, at 134.

154. Id. at 117, 134, 137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (forbidding slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime).

155. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 72, 298 (1999); see PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 89; see Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659, 659 (1991) (citing HANS MORAVEC, MIND CHILDREN 8 (1988)); see Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 90 YALE L.J. 1957, 1958 (1990).

156. Among his achievements, Kurzweil has invented reading machines for the blind, music synthesizers used by Stevie Wonder, and the leading speech-recognition technology. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at ii. In 1999, President William J. Clinton awarded him the 1999 National Medal of Technology, the nation's highest honor in technology. The Singularity: A Talk With Ray Kurzweil (John Brockman ed. Mar. 25, 2001), available at http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/kurzweil_singularity/kurzweil_singularity_index.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2002). Furthermore, three U.S. presidents have awarded him at least 10 honorary doctorates and honors. Id. He won the Association of American Publisher's Award for Most Outstanding Computer Science Book in 1990 for The Age of Intelligent Machines. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at ii. In 1988, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology declared him to be inventor of the year and in 1994 he won the Dickson Prize, the top science prize of Carnegie Mellon. Id. at ii.

157. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 73.

158. PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 90-91.

159. Id. at 91-92.

160. Id. at 92-94.

161. Id. at 90, 95.

162. RODNEY A. BROOKS, FLESH AND MACHINES: HOW ROBOTS WILL CHANGE US 181-84 (2002); KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 43; PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 95-96.

163. PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 96.

164. Id. at 96-98.

165. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 56.

166. Id. at 56, 104.

167. Id. at 56-57. However, an exception to the instinct-driven insect may be the honeybee, for which studies show it uses a highly complex system of communication involving body language. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 51, at 73-86.

168. Infra Parts II and III; BROOKS, supra note 162, at 153-54.

169. PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 156. See also WEBSTER'S, supra note 36, at 388; WISE, supra note 25, at 125-28.

170. PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 156.

171. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 229, 278-80. See also PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 204, 236 (predicting that human-level A.I. may be achieved as early as 2020 or perhaps as late as the year 2036).

172. PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 98.

173. Robert J. Spagnoletti, Using Artificial Intelligence to Aid in the Resolution of Socioscientific Disputes: A Theory for the Next Generation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 101, 114 (1987).

174. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 302; J.C. Smith, Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 313 (1998).

175. Rissland, supra note 155, at 1965 n.31; Smith, supra note 174, at 313.

176. Artificial Intelligence Center, University of Georgia, at http://www.ai.uga.edu/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).

177. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 220; Vernor Vinge, Essay on the Singularity, WHOLE EARTH REVIEW (Winter 1993), available at http://www.ugcs.caltech.edu/-phoenix/vinge/vinge-sing.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002); The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (Singularity Institute), What Is Seed AI?, at http://singinst.org/seedAI/seedAI.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).

178. Singularity Institute, What Is Seed AI?, supra note 177.

179. See Ben Goertzel, Thoughts on AI Morality (May 2002), pt. 4, at http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2002/AIMorality.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2002); Singularity Institute, What Is Seed AI?, supra note 177.

180. KURZWEIL, supra note 155.

181. Declan McCullagh, Making HAL Your Pal, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 19, 2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,43080,00.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002); Vinge, supra note 177; Singularity Resource Center, Singularitarian FAQ 1.1.2 (1.23) (ed. Gordon Worley), at http://www.midcoast.com/-pierce/singularitarian_FAQ.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). Vinge, a mathematics professor and Hugo Award winning science-fiction writer, popularized this modern conception of the singularity. McCullagh, id.

182. See KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 260 (predicting that future intelligent life will have the awesome power to prevent the collapse of the universe). By extension, in the future intelligent life may also have the power to create new universes to explore.

183. See Singularity Institute, Introduction—Why A.I.?, at http://singinst.org/intro/whyAI.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (stating that A.I. would come before nanocomputers); see Singularity Institute, What Is Seed AI?, supra note 177 (explains the super-genuis capabilities of an advanced A.I. being that can modify its own brain).

184. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 137, 307. A nanometer is one billionth the length of a meter, and is the equivalent to five carbon atoms. Id. See also PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 119-25; K. ERIC DREXLER & CHRIS PETERSON, UNBOUNDING THE FUTURE: THE NANOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (1991); Frederick A. Fieldler & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISP, L.J. 593, 595-601 (1994) (all explaining nanotechnology).

185. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 139-40.

186. PAUL C. LIN-EASTON, It's Time for Environmentalists to Think Small—Real Small: A Call for the Involvement of Environmental Lawyers in Developing Precautionary Policies for Molecular Nanotechnology, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 112-13 (2001); Kevin Bonsor, How Nanotechnology Will Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/nanotechnology2.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2002). See also KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 140.

187. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 139-40.

188. PAUL & COX, supra note 107, at 293.

189. Id. at 298.

190. FERRY, supra note 43, at 128.

191. E.g., STAR TREK: FIRST CONTACT (Paramount 1996), depicting how future contact with alien intelligent life brings humanity together in a quest for intellectual enlightenment, which takes the place of the materialism motivated society of the present era. Also notable in this future world is the presence of "replicator" technology, similar to nanotechnology, which allows the creation of virtually any food or other essential product out of thin air.

192. E.g., Goertzel, supra note 179.

193. See Magnus Boman, Norms in Artificial Decision Making, 7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 17, 19, 22 (1999).

194. Id. at 17.

195. Mark Geitsfeld, Implementing the Precautionary Principle, 31 ELR 11326 (Nov. 2001), cites to Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, § 15, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5 (1992), reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). See also John Charles Kunich, Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 856 (2001); Gregory D. Fullem, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1995).

196. Boman, supra note 193, at 19, 22.

197. Id. at 22.

198. Id. at 19, 22.

199. Id. at 22.

200. BROOKS, supra note 162, at 72 (citing ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950)).

201. BROOKS, supra note 162, at 72 (quoting ASIMOV, I, ROBOT, supra note 200).

202. Roger Clarke, Asimov's Laws of Robotics: Implications for Information Technology, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/SOS/Asimov.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).

203. Id. (quoting ISAAC ASIMOV, ROBOTS AND EMPIRE (1985)).

204. BROOKS, supra note 162, at 73; Goertzel, supra note 179, pt. 1.

205. See BROOKS, supra note 162, at 203; see Goertzel, supra note 179, pt. 1.

206. See Goertzel, supra note 179. For information about Ben Goertzel's expertise in the field of A.I., see The Third Culture: Ben Goertzel, at http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/bios/goertzel.html (last visited July 28, 2002).

207. Geortzel, supra note 179, pt. 4; Singularity Institute, What Is Seed AI?, supra note 177.

208. Goertzel, supra note 179, pt. 5.

209. Id. pt. 5.

210. Id. pt. 3 (discussing basic values and derived values).

211. Id. pts. 2, 5.

212. Id. pts. 2, 5.

213. See Goertzel, supra note 179, pt. 3:

A subtle point that arises here is that one species's basic value may be another one's derived value …. For instance, to us humans, "value human life" is a basic value, and "value life" is a largely separate (and much weaker) basic value. How much, for instance, fetuses or cows (or cow fetuses!) are valued, is culturally and individually variant. For an AGI [artificial general intelligence] that has "value life" as a basic value, on the other hand, "value human life" may well be a specific, derived moral rule, with a similar status to "value fetuses" or "value cows" in human psychology and culture.

214. See id., pts. 4, 5 (describing how specific rules are threatened by the self-modification process).

215. See generally REDMAN, supra note 14.

216. Id.

217. Eliezer Yudkowsky, Singularity Institute, Creating Friendly AI: The Analysis and Design of Benevolent Goal Architectures, (June 15, 2001) (Version 1.0), available at http://singinst.org/CFAI.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).

218. Id. § 3.1.

219. Id. § 3.4.4.

220. Id.

221. Id.

222. Diamond, for his part, takes a pessimistic view toward humans' likelihood of embracing intelligent non-human life based on our past treatment of apes and even our treatment of less technologically advanced humans. DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 1, at 214-15 (predicting genocide should humans ever find or be found by intelligent extraterrestrial life).

223. SINGER, supra note 25, at 7 (emphasis in the original).

224. See id. at 11 (explaining the similarities between human and non-human organic animals' nervous systems and that the capacity to feel pain performs the evolutionary function of furthering survival).

225. Id. In Rattling the Cage, Wise avoids the question of concern for high-level "conscious" A.I. by rejecting the notion that A.I. will achieve consciousness. WISE, supra note 25, at 156-58.

226. See SINGER, supra note 25, at 7.

227. See Joel Garreau, The Next Generation: Biotechnology May Make Superhero Fantasy a Reality, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2002, at C1 (quoting Kurzweil as stating: "What is unique about human beings is our ability to create abstract models and to use these mental models to understand the world and do something about it.").

228. E.g., David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 751-52 (1995).

229. See Eric Blumenson, Who Counts Morally?, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 9-10 (1999-2000) (discussing the recognition of human rights in A.I. beings and in other creatures based on certain "human" attributes).

230. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992). See cf. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); Kevin D. Debre, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or Enslaving Science, 16 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 221 (1989); Fishman, supra note 126; Pizzulli, supra note 120; Michael D. Rivard, Toward A General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1992) (all discussing rights of animals, humans, and humanoids created through genetic manipulation).

231. See BROOKS, supra note 162, at 194-95.

232. As A.I. beings will presumably, at first, have no right to vote and thus lack direct representation in the political system, their natural recourse would be to turn to the judiciary, which performs a constitutional function of protecting those not adequately represented by the elected branches of government. See Jon Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition for Redress for the Environment, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 321, 340 (2001).

233. Star Trek: The Next Generation: "The Measure of a Man," (television broadcast originally aired Feb. 11, 1988). See Paul Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation: Images of the Law, Lawyers, and the Legal System in "Star Trek: The Next Generation," 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 72-80 (1992) (providing a valuable discussion of "The Measure of a Man" and other stories involving A.I. and their rights). Interestingly, an attorney wrote this episode. Id. at 56 n.69, 80.

234. Id.

235. Id.

236. Id.

237. Id.

238. Id.

239. Id.

240. Id.

241. Id.

242. Id.

243. Id.

244. Id. (remarks of Guinan, played by Whoopi Goldberg).

245. SINGER, supra note 25, at xxiii (Preface to the 1975 edition of Animal Liberation).

246. Id.

247. See generally, e.g., KURZWEIL, supra note 155.

248. See id.

249. Scientists Test First Human Cyborg, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/03/22/human.cyborg/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).

250. Id.

251. Id.

252. Guy Gugliotta, Rats Turned Into Remote-Controlled Robots, WASH. POST, May 2, 2002, at A1.

253. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 128-29.

254. Id.

255. See generally cf. Boman, supra note 193; Rosaria Conte et al., Introduction: Agents and Norms: How to Fill the Gap?, 7 ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 1 (1999) (both explaining the concept of multi-agent systems, in which several autonomous A.I. beings interact with each other to fulfill individual goals and to maximize the group or societal utility). See also. cf. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 147 (envisioning a new form of group sex in which several individuals at different physical locations will share the same experience together).

256. JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 207-20 (Giovanni Sartor & Karl Branting eds., 1998), reprinted in, Michele Taruffo, Judicial Decisions and Artificial Intelligence, 6 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 331 (1998); Anthony D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977).

257. See Singularity Institute, What Is Seed AI?, supra note 177.

258. Cf. DARK CITY (New Line Cinema 1998) (science-fiction film depicting the creation of new personas by switching the memories of different people); MEMENTO (Columbia/Tri-Star 2001) (film portraying the story of a man with no short-term memory, who can alter his identity by changing or discarding the facts he discovers). But of course humans turned into cyborgs might also be programmed against their will to become slaves to those who wield the technology. Cf. Gugliotta, supra note 252 (reporting that scientists have successfully turned rats into robots under their control).

259. See GERRY SPENCE, HOW TO ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 86-92 (1995).

260. Id.

261. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 146-53. See also A.I.: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Dream Works 2001) (movie about the ethical implications of building an android "child" who feels emotion and is programmed with unconditional love for his human "parents"); Richard Barry, Sentience: The Next Moral Dilemma, at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2083942,00.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002) (discussing whether religious authorities will treat sentient robots as "persons").

262. See cf. SINGER, supra note 25, at xiii-xiv (theorizing that recognition of rights of apes will lead, by analogy, to consideration of the welfare of other, less "human" animals).

263. See Mendelson, supra note 87, at 800 (explaining that the replacement of animals with plants and computer simulations was one of the three goals of the 1985 Amendments to the Animal Welfare Act).

264. See KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 280.

265. See Yudkowsky, supra note 217, § 2.1.

266. Id. § 2.1.

267. Id.

268. See Goertzel, supra note 179, pt. 2 (emphasis in original):

For one thing, I would like an [A.I. being] to consider human beings as having a great deal of value. I would prefer, for instance, if the Earth did not become densely populated with [A.I. beings] that feel about humans as most humans feel about cows and sheep—let alone as most humans feel about ants or bacteria or instances of Microsoft Word. To see the potential problem here, consider the possibility of a future [A.I. being] whose intelligence is as much greater than ours, as ours is greater than that of a sheep or an ant or even a bacterium. Why should it value us particularly? Perhaps it can create creatures of our measly intelligence and complexity level without hardly any effort at all. In that case, can we really expect it to value us significantly?

269. See DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE, supra note 1, at 214-15 (predicting genocide should humans ever find or be found by intelligent extraterrestrial life, based on the long history of humans destroying technologically inferior humans and animals).

270. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).

271. KURZWEIL, supra note 155, at 139-40.

272. See id. at 304 (defining "idiot savant" as including either a system or a person).

273. See Rivard, supra note 230, at 1489-90.

274. Id. at 1489-90.

275. Cf. Boman, supra note 193, at 17, explaining the conventional concept of multi-agent systems, that being multiple autonomous A.I. (or "agents") with differing goals and abilities, interacting with each other in the same environment. Boman also describes situations in which some A.I. may sacrifice their own, individual interests to further the group utility. Id. at 28, 30.

276. E.g., Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes on Account of Their Children?: Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (2000).

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