Joint-Implementation Essentials for Lawyers

Richard J. Blaustein

Richard J. Blaustein is an environmental lawyer in private practice. He represented the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, a sustainable-development compilation, at the International Congress on Environment/Climate, organized by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, held in Rome in March 1996.

[26 ELR 10364]

Joint implementation provides U.S. companies an opportunity to contribute to an officially sanctioned effort to reduce greenhouse-gas¹ emissions, the anthropogenic cause of global warming. Joint implementation typically takes place in developing countries, with the financial and technical assistance of sponsors in the developed world. They are part of a sophisticated initiative, the potential social benefits of which include not only mitigating climate change, but also preserving biodiversity in threatened locales in the developing world and making a significant contribution to poorer nations' sustainable development.

The most recent international climate-change agreement² alludes to the possibility of the emergence of a trading regime for greenhouse-gas emissions, similar to the domestic acid-rain program. If such a regime does emerge, domestic investors can expect accrual of prospective pollution allowances generated by joint-implementation projects to provide them some return on their overseas investments. Other financial incentives for participating in joint implementation include advantageous entry into developing-world markets (in particular, the emerging global energy market); relatively inexpensive research and development for innovative energy and land use processes; and direct short-term returns through biodiversity prospecting, timber sales, and energy revenues.

Joint-implementation projects have received the advocacy and bureaucratic support of the Clinton Administration, notwithstanding a continued debate that has often pitted developed and developing countries against one another in international climate-change fora. The Clinton Administration, in fact, has instituted the United States Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI), which has undergone two rounds of project proposals and acceptances. Presently, the USIJI has sanctioned 15 joint-implementation projects, with a potential investment of more than $ 244 million.³

Environmental lawyers who wish to advise their clients on joint implementation must understand the international and domestic law and political processes that govern and shape joint-implementation endeavors. In particular, attorneys must be familiar with the law and diplomatic activity that stems from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),⁴ U.S. policy and bureaucratic support for joint implementation, and the specific domestic rules and legal issues attendant to joint-implementation projects. These three areas of climate-change law and politics are subject to some flux due to domestic and international political events. Attending the private, governmental, and international meetings that discuss the uncertainties and possibilities of joint implementation also helps lawyers to comprehend climate-change and joint-implementation issues.

International Climate-Change Law: The FCCC and the Berlin Mandate

Advocates for efforts to mitigate climate change succeeded in making global warming a major international concern in the 1980s. In response to this political advocacy and significant, although not uniform, support from scientists, the United Nations launched a diplomatic and legal effort to forge a binding legal instrument to address global warming. In 1990, the United Nations' first Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on the Framework Convention on Climate Change met. The United Nations had also established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), designed to provide a scientific understanding of the dynamics, risks, and uncertainties of climate change.

In May of 1992, the INC met for the fifth time and proffered to the United Nations General Assembly an international treaty designed to reduce the threat of global warming. The United Nations adopted the draft Framework Convention on Climate Change in New York in preparation for the June 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, better known as the Earth Summit.

Two binding treaties were opened for signature at the Earth Summit: the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity⁵ and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Despite the Clinton Administration's support for the Convention on Biological Diversity, it has not garnered the necessary support in the Senate to become law. The FCCC, on the other hand, was signed by the Bush Administration at Rio and was fully ratified on October 6, 1992, becoming U.S. law.⁶

Over 150 nations have ratified the FCCC. In its often-quoted [26 ELR 10365] Article 2, the FCCC stipulates its broad goal of reducing the threat of global warming while fostering policies for sustainable development. This provision reads:

The ultimate objective of this Convention … is to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.⁷

In pursuit of this objective, the FCCC includes one set of provisions that apply to both developed and developing countries, and another set that is solely applicable to "developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex 1."⁸ Among the commitments that all nations must fulfill are the development and periodic publication of "national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks (conservation sites that sequester greenhouse gases) of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol";⁹ the formulation, implementation and regular update of "national, and where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate";¹⁰ and the "sustainable management, … conservation and enhancement … of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems."¹¹ Significantly, the FCCC also contains provisions that promote the development and dissemination of technologies and knowledge to mitigate global warming,¹² and establishes a Conference of the Parties (COP) to be convened in the future to review and revise climate mitigation obligations pursuant to the FCCC.¹³

Article 4(2) of the FCCC applies an ambitious goal solely to "developed country Parties and others included in Annex I."¹⁴ This provision commits Annex I countries to

policies and measures that will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases … would contribute to such modification.¹⁵

Importantly, the Annex I parties commit to enact national programs that would "aim" to reduce the level of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 level.¹⁶ This commitment has generated some resentment in business circles and among certain members of the U.S. Congress.

To alleviate the extra obligations that developed countries assumed, the FCCC held out the possibility that developed countries could achieve the "aim" of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels through climate-change mitigation measures in the developing world. In other words, developed countries could achieve numerical reductions in their own emissions in the setting of a developing country, through a partnership with the developing country. Developing countries are not required to reduce emissions, however, Article 4(2)(a) specifically mentions that Annex 1 parties "may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph (i.e. returning to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions)."¹⁷ The all-important FCCC Article 4(2)(b) furthers the possibility of joint implementation by calling on Annex I nations to enact climate-change mitigation policies "with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Conference of the Parties."¹⁸

Notwithstanding the FCCC's explicit mention of the possibility of joint implementation, the treaty was far from clear about its vision for joint-implementation activities within the broader effort to reduce the threat of global warming. The FCCC left it to the first session of the COP to "take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation."¹⁹ Among the vagaries left to be resolved for future deliberations were how and to what extent emissions reductions achieved in the developing world with developed nations' assistance were to be measured and awarded; whether reductions were creditable in this last decade of the 20th century; and whether an emissions trading system would be an integral part of the international environmental regime envisioned by the politicians, legal experts, and others who influence climate change diplomacy.

After the Earth Summit, unresolved issues regarding joint implementation were debated in the INC meetings and other nonofficial fora. Advocates emphasized the cost effectiveness and opportunities for sustainable-development aid associated with joint-implementation projects, while critics voiced skepticism of the effectiveness of the program and the intentions of developed countries.

Although the debate continues, the possibilities for joint implementation were bolstered by the first meeting of the COP, convened in Berlin in the spring of 1995, nearly two years after the Earth Summit. The Berlin meeting produced a set of decisions that is now referred to as the "Berlin Mandate."²⁰ Decision 1 is probably the most important decision of the Berlin Mandate, and has great bearing on the future of joint implementation. It asserted that the FCCC [26 ELR 10366] obligations of developed countries to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions were "not adequate" and that the COP must instigate a process for the post-2000 period that will strengthen "the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I … through the adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument."²¹ Specifically, this process would aim "to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within the specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol."²² Decision I reaffirmed existing FCCC commitments for developing countries, but directed that the process should not "introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I."²³

The process called for by the Berlin Mandate is already being carried out through discussions within what is known as the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AG-BM). The AG-BM will produce a report on its efforts at the second Conference of the Parties in October 1996, and "should be scheduled to ensure completion of the work as early as possible in 1997, with a view to adopting the results at the third session of the Conference of the Parties."²⁴

Decision 1 has much significance for the future of joint-implementation ventures. First, the COP decided that more specific quantification of the levels of greenhouse gases were needed. This more rigid system will be more likely to provide an economic context for assigning values to emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases, thus providing joint-implementation projects with a basis for economic expectations and calculations. Second, the extra obligations placed on developed countries, alongside the absence of new commitments for developing nations, will provide further incentive for cost-effective emission-reduction projects in locales throughout the world that otherwise would have no such attraction for either land use or energy projects.

Other portions of the Berlin Mandate clarified many of the vagaries that the FCCC spawned. Decision 5 focused solely on joint-implementation projects, under the rubric "activities implemented jointly." Acknowledging that "the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response,"²⁵ the COP stated that joint-implementation projects currently could "not be seen as fulfillment of current commitments of Annex I Parties under Article 4.2(b) of the Convention."²⁶ In other words, according to Decision 5 of the Berlin Mandate, emissions reductions produced by joint implementation in the developing world could not be counted toward the developed countries' attainment of 1990 emissions levels.

Of crucial significance, the Berlin Mandate did specifically establish "a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly."²⁷ During this pilot phase, the FCCC's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice will,

in coordination with the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, establish a framework for reporting, in a transparent, well-defined and credible fashion, on the possible global benefits and the national economic, social and environmental impacts as well as any practical experience gained or technical difficulties encountered in activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase.²⁸

Furthermore, by stipulating that "no credits shall accrue to any Party as a result of greenhouse gas emissions reduced or sequestered during the pilot phase from activities implemented jointly,"²⁹ the COP at Berlin left open the possibility of an emissions-trading regime emerging from the current negotiation process for the post-2000 period.

Thus, joint implementation has progressed from the ambiguous status that the text of the Earth Summit's FCCC text afforded it to the concrete establishment of a pilot phase ending in the year 2000. Although the Berlin Mandate stipulates that no credits for reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions may accrue during the pilot phase, the Berlin Mandate did not rule out the accrual of credits for reductions achieved after 2000 by projects implemented during the pilot phase. Moreover, the Berlin Mandate clearly left open the possibility for an allowance trading system or other such crediting system to be authorized by the third COP in 1997. Clearly, the international legal effort to reduce global warming has endorsed joint implementation as an integrated part, however unresolved its extent may be.

The United States Initiative on Joint Implementation

On Earth Day 1993, President Clinton reaffirmed U.S. adherence to the FCCC when he proclaimed:

We must take the lead in addressing the challenge of global warming that could make our planet and its climate less hospitable and more hostile to human life. Today, I reaffirm my personal, and announce our nation's, commitment to reducing our emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000. I am instructing my administration to produce a cost-effective plan … that can continue the trend of reduced emissions. This must be a clarion call, not for more bureaucracy or regulation or unnecessary costs, but instead for American ingenuity and creativity to produce the best and most effective cost-efficient technology.³⁰

The President's directive was executed when the Administration issued the Climate Action Plan in October 1993. Made up of approximately 50 distinct initiatives, the Climate Action Plan "targets multiple emission reduction opportunities in all major areas: energy demand in the residential, commercial, industrial and transportation sectors, energy supply, methane and other gases, and forestry."³¹ Stressing voluntary commitments and government/private cooperation, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) lead in administering the Climate Action Plan. Among the most prominent of the Climate Action Plan's actions are the [26 ELR 10367] Climate Challenge initiative and the expansion of EPA's Green Lights program. Under the Climate Challenge initiative, nearly 80 percent of domestic utilities have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOE outlining "their commitment to … reduce, limit, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions."³² The Green Lights program similarly features a Memorandum of Understanding arrangement between EPA and the private participant, who will, with EPA's technical support, "upgrade lighting equipment with more energy-efficient systems."³³

Although the Clinton Administration maintained in 1993 that the "Climate Action Plan will achieve the goal of returning U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 with domestic actions alone,"³⁴ the United States also announced a pilot program for joint implementation in the Climate Action Plan. In its 1994 Climate Action Report, issued pursuant to the FCCC's reporting provisions, the Clinton Administration further articulated its rationale for its vigorous support of joint implementation. The Report stated that:

Joint implementation could achieve greater emission reductions than would be possible if each country pursued only domestic actions, and could achieve these reductions more cost effectively. Joint implementation could also spur technology cooperation — increasing developing countries' access to energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies, including providing countries with additional operational capability, while stimulating export markets for industrialized countries.³⁵

The bureaucratic support for joint implementation was mobilized in October 1993 when the government proposed the United States Initiative on Joint Implementation. After about a six-month comment period, the final ground rules for the USIJI were published,³⁶ commencing the government's joint-implementation effort, and thereafter, project applications were accepted. The USIJI has also issued detailed guidelines for joint-implementation projects.³⁷

The USIJI currently consists of three interagency groups that collectively run the U.S. joint-implementation effort: the Interagency Working Group; the Evaluation Panel; and the Secretariat. The Interagency Working Group, chaired by the Department of State, is in charge of overall policy development and international strategy.

Lawyers involved in joint-implementation projects will interact mostly with the USIJI Secretariat. EPA and the DOE are the lead agencies in the Secretariat, and the Secretariat's responsibilities include managing day-to-day operations, developing evaluation guidelines, giving technical assistance, disseminating information, and serving as the government contact for private joint-implementation participants and applicants. The USIJI's Evaluation Panel is authorized to approve or disapprove project applications. The Evaluation Panel also oversees the Secretariat and is co-chaired by EPA and the DOE, with members from the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Treasury.

Two rounds of project evaluations and acceptances had taken place as of January 1996. Seven projects were selected for the first round in February 1995, made up of energy and land use projects in Belize, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Honduras, and Russia. The government has estimated that these seven projects represent more than $ 40 million in private investment. The second round of the USIJI's acceptance process was announced in December 1995, in Washington, D.C. From among 21 applicants, 8 projects were approved that, when fully implemented, could "represent private sector investments that could top $ 200 million."³⁸

Two different, yet illustrative, joint-implementation projects approved in the second round were the Dona Julia Hydroelectric Project and the BIODIVERSIFIX Forest Restoration Project, both in Costa Rica. The Dona Julia Hydroelectric Project involves the building of a 16-megawatt hydroelectric plant in northern Costa Rica that is expected to displace "30-mega watt thermal units that burn high-sulfur diesel fuels, bunker oils, and IFO 180 fuels."³⁹ Over a five-year operating span, a "net reduction of 314,283 metric tons in carbon dioxide emissions" is expected.⁴⁰ The BIODIVERSIFIX Forest Restoration Project, in contrast, is a land use project that will "regenerate tropical dry and tropical wet forest"⁴¹ through land conservation and land purchases. This innovative project links measures for mitigating climate change with biodiversity industries (tropical prospecting for chemicals, hard woods, and ecotourism). It is planned for a 50-year lifetime and is "projected to sequester 3.1 million metric tons of carbon."⁴²

The high number of joint-implementation projects in Costa Rica — eight total — is due in part to American diplomatic efforts, as well as Costa Rica's support of joint implementation. On September 30, 1994, U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Costa Rica President Jose Maria Figueres signed an agreement that "endorses the use of bilateral private sector partnerships to reduce greenhouse gas emissions."⁴³ The United States has signed similar agreements with Bolivia, Chile, the countries of Central America collectively, and Pakistan. The United States also entered into a recent understanding with South Africa regarding sustainable development. U.S. officials have advocated joint implementation's part in the effort to combat global warming not only by means of such agreements, but also in a wide range of diplomatic meetings and negotiations.

Domestic Regulations and Legal Issues

Joint-implementation projects must abide by the laws of the United States and the countries in which they are implemented. Thus, U.S. lawyers should have a sense of the [26 ELR 10368] other country's laws and norms, and it is often useful to work with local counsel and/or a local organization. Attorneys also need to be competent in U.S. contract law as well as environmental law. Most important, U.S. attorneys must have a sophisticated grasp of the ground rules, criteria, and guidelines for joint-implementation projects. Although these regulations are clearly written and straightforward, they encompass a wide range of complex issues pertaining to greenhouse-gas reductions and project financing.

Part I of the USIJI project-proposal guidelines, which specify how joint-implementation applications are to be organized and submitted, asks for specific information such as the U.S. and foreign "corporate or administrative officer responsible for the project" and "contact person for the project, if different from above."⁴⁴ Part II, "Project Information" of the Guidelines, lists criteria for some of the more complex issues attendant to joint-implementation projects. Applicants are expected to submit written descriptions of how their projects fulfill these criteria. Among the most intricate issues are the identification of greenhouse-gas sources and sinks in the baseline case, the plan to reduce or sequester greenhouse-gas emissions, the project's funding, emissions-reductions assignment, and the controversial issue of "additionality." Part III calls for, among other things, specific estimates of the greenhouse-gas emissions and sequestration before and after the project is fully activated, and the monitoring and "external verification" of the future greenhouse-gas reductions and sequestration.

The issues of additionality and funding, while not identical, are closely related. Both follow the dictates of the FCCC and the Berlin Mandate. Additionality, which describes the uniqueness of a joint-implementation project, is addressed in USIJI ground rule V(A)(1). The rule states that an acceptable joint-implementation project "involves specific measures to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas emissions initiated as the result of the U.S. Initiative, or in reasonable anticipation thereof."⁴⁵ Expounding on this point, the USIJI guidelines state that "project applicants will need to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Panel that the measures undertaken or to be undertaken are above and beyond what would reasonably have been or likely to occur otherwise."⁴⁶ In effect, the additionality provision precludes projects from gaining joint-implementation status if they were instigated before the launching of the joint-implementation program, were ongoing, or were clearly going to be instituted in the normal and expected course of business. Many businesses, especially utilities, have criticized the additionality criteria's strictness, because many of their operations, planned or actual, have significantly lowered greenhouse-gas emission rates. Aware of business displeasure with the additionality requirement, USIJI policy maintains that "the integrity of the program will be undermined if participants simply repackage activities without change from what would otherwise be undertaken."⁴⁷

The USIJI funding requirements similarly insist that joint-implementation projects be unique. For example, if a project receives some federal financial assistance — a possibility that the ground rules and guidelines do not preclude — the ground rules stipulate that the project must "be undertaken with funds in excess of those available in fiscal year 1993."⁴⁸ Once again, the guidelines elucidate this ground rule by stating that "the [Evaluation] Panel will require only enough information to ensure that the financial aspects of the project have been adequately considered, and that simple repackaging of federally or multilaterally funded projects does not occur."⁴⁹

Despite the USIJI's insistence on government funding in excess of 1993 levels, the USIJI is in many respects quite flexible in its funding requirement. Funding sources must list their approximate share of funding, but all funding need not actually have been secured at the time of application: joint-implementation ventures can continue to look for additional financial contributions after a joint-implementation project has been accepted. The USIJI also offers applicants and participants information on the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and other domestic and international sources of project funding and insurance.

The mandatory criterion of host-country approval and the precatory criterion of a written discussion of the project's nongreenhouse gas effects are also similar, though distinct. These criteria follow the FCCC and the Berlin Mandate provisions that specify that activities implemented jointly not only require host country authorization,⁵⁰ but also "should be compatible with and supportive of national environment and development priorities and strategies."⁵¹

The demonstration and documentation of host-country approval of a project is an overriding criterion for the USIJI's approval of the project. The USIJI's guidelines specify that the Evaluation Panel must be provided with "written evidence from the designated responsible ministry of the host country that the project is acceptable to the national or federal government of the project's host country."⁵² This written proof is expected to have the signature of a high-level representative of the host country and must specify the approval of the individual project. Bilateral agreements that support joint-implementation projects in principle are not sufficient to convince the Evaluation Panel of host-country approval.

Although not mandatory, a discussion of the criteria of ground rule V(B)(2) will influence the Evaluation Panel's decision on a joint-implementation project. This ground rule specifies that the Evaluation Panel "shall also consider … the potential positive and negative effects of the project apart from its effect on greenhouse gas emissions reduced or sequestered."⁵³ The guidelines expand on this rule by asking applicants to describe not only positive and negative environmental impacts other than greenhouse-gas impacts, but also "the potential positive and negative non-environmental effects of the project, including but not limited to economic development, cultural and gender effects, sustainability, [26 ELR 10369] technology transfer, public participation, and capacity building."⁵⁴ Some interested in joint implementation have criticized this provision, even though it is secondary and not mandatory. In the June 1995 USIJI workshop in Alexandria, Virginia, private parties expressed concern that the request for a discussion of effects other than greenhouse-gas effects could cause this provision to become inflated to the point of resembling a requirement for an environmental impact statement. USIJI officials, however, stress that the provision is not mandatory and is important to ensuring that projects have an overall positive effect in their foreign locale.

Ground rules V(3), V(5), V(6), and V(9) and Section III of the guidelines deal with baseline estimates of greenhouse-gas emissions and sequestration, calculations of reductions and sequestrations, monitoring, and external verification. These provisions ask for authentication that describes the technical-estimation processes employed. Lawyers who take the lead in organizing a joint-implementation project will most likely lack the expertise to address these technical issues. If the private sponsor of a project does not have the facilities, skill, or experience in greenhouse-gas measurement procedures, environmental groups with scientific and technical resources are often needed as joint-implementation partners. Even if sponsors do possess the technical know-how, a U.S. or foreign domestic environmental organization brought into a joint-implementation project will add perspective and legitimacy to a project's design and execution, especially with regard to baseline and mitigation estimates.

Another area of law in which lawyers must be adept while working on a joint-implementation project is contracts. Joint-implementation projects involve many preliminary, interim, and final agreements, all of which include provisions on complex financing, technical, environmental, and profit-distribution issues. Many projects hope for a return on their investment if and when the FCCC process implements an emissions trading regime, whatever the form. This is an especially complicated issue, as greenhouse gases have not yet acquired tangible economic worth, although many policymakers and economists are developing the marketing dynamics from which economic value can emerge. For this issue, lawyers need to draft sophisticated and clear contracts that specify how potential economic gains that are not yet measurable would be divided. A typical contract might divide up future allowances according to investment contributions, but this may not be the best arrangement for every contract.

For contract issues and most, even the most complex, of the issues that the ground rules and guidelines address, the USIJI offers the public literature and personal assistance.⁵⁵ Private, U.S. government, and international joint-implementation workshops are scheduled during the year, which are an invaluable source for private participants and government officials to exchange policy, technical, and legal information.

An understanding of the treaties, domestic policies and documents, and global trends that bear on joint implementation is essential for lawyers who work or wish to work on joint-implementation projects. Fortunately, attorneys can participate in the USIJI by becoming familiar with readily available documents, supportive literature, and technical advice. Attorneys who previously were unfamiliar with climate-change law and processes may very well find the near future conducive to launching a variety of projects that will reduce the threat of climate change, contribute to global sustainable development, and offer economic rewards to private investors.

1. "Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, … methane, … nitrous oxide, … and ozone." U.S. GOVERNMENT, CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 53 (1994) [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION REPORT]. The burning of fossil fuel in energy generation, for example, is a prime source of emissions, and large natural biodiverse conservation sites (sinks) often sequester these emissions.

2. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its First Session, Held at Berlin From 28 March To 7 April 1995, at Decision 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/Dec.1/1(f) (1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].

3. U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, Press Package, Dec. 19, 1995, (on file with author) [hereinafter Press Package].

4. 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 12, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994).

5. 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Nov. 1993).

6. 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 12, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 38, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

7. 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 4, at art. 2.

8. Id. art. 4.2.

9. Id. art. 4.1(a).

10. Id. art. 4.1(b).

11. Id. art. 4.1(d).

12. Id. art. 4.1(c), (g), (h), (i).

13. Id. art. 7.

14. Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, European Economic Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. A special marking is made for the Annex I "(c)ountries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy," qualifying them as possible joint-implementation sites. Id. Annex I.

15. Id. art. 4.2(a).

16. Id. art. 4.2(b).

17. Id. art. 4.2(a).

18. Id. art. 4.2(b).

19. Id. art. 4.2(d).

20. Berlin Mandate, supra note 2, at Decision 1(II).

21. Id. Decision 1(II).

22. Id. Decision 1 (II)(2)(a).

23. Id. Decision 1(II)(2)(b).

24. Id. Decision 1(III)(6).

25. Id. Decision 5.

26. Id. Decision 5(b).

27. Id. Decision 5(1)(a).

28. Id. Decision 5(2)(a).

29. Id. Decision 5(1)(f)

30. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.

31. PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE JR., THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 7 (1993) [hereinafter THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN].

32. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.

33. Id. at 86.

34. THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 27.

35. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 1, at 102.

36. 58 Fed. Reg. 28442 (June 1, 1994).

37. U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation Secretariat, Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal, I(A) & (B) [hereinafter Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal].

38. U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, Joint Implementation Projects Chosen; U.S. Companies Help Combat Global Climate Change, Dec. 19, 1995, at 2 (press release on file with author).

39. Press Package, supra note 3.

40. Id.

41. Id.

42. Id.

43. U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation Secretariat, International Partnerships Reports 1 (Fall 1994).

44. Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal, supra note 37, at I(A) & (B).

45. U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, Final Ground Rules for USIJI (V)(A)(2) (1994) [hereinafter Final Ground Rules for USIJI].

46. Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal, supra note 37, at (II)(D).

47. Id.

48. Final Ground Rules for USIJI, supra note 45, at (V)(A)(2).

49. Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal, supra note 37, at (II)(B).

50. Berlin Mandate, supra note 2, at Decision 5.1(c).

51. Id. Decision 5.1(b).

52. Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal, supra note 37, at (II)(E).

53. Final Ground Rules for USIJI, supra note 45, at (V)(A)(2).

54. Guidelines for a USIJI Project Proposal, supra note 37, at (IV)(A) & (B).

55. The USIJI has a fax-on-demand menu at (202) 260-8677 and the USIJI Secretariat can be reached at (202) 426-0072.